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FOREWORD
Since World War II, the relationship between
Turkey and the United States has been characterized
by complexity and flux; there have been periods
of remarkable cooperation, even when significant
disagreements existed. Relations between the two
countries are never merely bilateral, for the two are
also linked to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and the European Union (EU). The relationship
between those two organizations is also complicated
because of differing core purposes and somewhat
differing memberships. Current Turkey-U.S. diplomatic and military relations are more strained than in
recent years, but both countries recognize how vital it
is to address issues of mutual importance.
In mid-2007 the Atlantic Council, Strategic
Studies Institute, and German Marshall Fund of
the United States jointly organized a conference to
discuss the current state of U.S.-Turkish-EU ties and
to consider how those relations might be repaired
and enhanced. Participants included an impressive
collection of diplomats, academics, and policy analysts
with extensive knowledge and relevant experience.
This conference report provides an overview of the
enduring issues that must be addressed if Turkey-U.S.
relations are to move beyond current roadblocks and
begin to realize their full potential. Since the conference
that served as the basis of this report took place, the
political environment in Turkey has changed, and
several of the issues, such as the use of Iraq as a staging
area by Kurdish insurgents, have continued to evolve.
Such dynamics reveal the importance of the ideas
surfaced in each of the conference presentations and
the need to continue addressing the issues identified.
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Such work should prove valuable to policymakers
of both countries in their efforts to improve this vital
relationship.

		
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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CHAPTER 1
REBUILDING U.S.-TURKEY RELATIONS
IN A TRANSATLANTIC CONTEXT
Frances G. Burwell
The relationship between Turkey and the United
States stands at a critical juncture. The crises over the
bases of Kurdish insurgents (the Partiya Karkeren
Kurdistan or Kurdish Workers Party [PKK]) in northern
Iraq and a recent congressional resolution recalling the
Armenian genocide demonstrate the severe erosion that
has occurred since the end of the Cold War. Recent toplevel meetings in Ankara and Washington produced
conciliatory rhetoric, but they did not prevent a Turkish
ground incursion into northern Iraq in late February
2008, and whether they will prevent a reawakening
of the congressional resolution next year is far from
clear. President George W. Bush has promised new
levels of intelligence sharing and military liaison, but
unless there are rapid, concrete results, these steps are
likely to seem rather meager assistance to those Turks
who see the U.S. invasion of Iraq as having enabled
a deadly PKK resurgence. The Bush administration
does seem to have blocked further consideration of
the congressional resolution on Armenian genocide,
but only after tensions with the Turkish government
escalated to extremely high levels.
For the moment, with the Turkish ground incursion
having ended, both of these disputes appear to be in
abeyance, but the more fundamental challenge remains.
The U.S.-Turkey relationship has never recovered from
the end of the Cold War. Washington and Ankara have
not yet established a basis for a renewed partnership,
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and in the meantime many Turks have concluded that
the United States no longer takes Turkish interests into
account as an ally should. In fact, a recent Pew survey
found that 64 percent of Turks view the United States
as the greatest threat to Turkey, and only 9 percent of
Turks have a positive view of the United States.
The United States and Turkey must find a new
foundation for their relationship. While the Soviet
threat which prompted their partnership has ended,
the United States and Turkey still share many strategic
interests, including fighting terrorism and ensuring
stability in the wider Middle East region. To date,
Ankara and Washington have found it difficult to
work together in confronting those challenges, as the
crisis over the PKK bases in Iraq amply demonstrates.
Paradoxically, it is these issues—the fight against
terrorism and the need for stability in the wider Middle
East—that, along with energy security, offer the most
opportunities for potential collaboration and thus the
basis for a reinvigorated partnership.
The strains between Turkey and the United States
have coincided with growing doubts about Turkey’s
eventual accession to the European Union (EU).
Turkey’s relationship with the EU has never been
smooth, but after making significant progress toward
meeting the accession criteria in 2004-05, Turkey
now seems unable to quell doubts in Europe as to
whether it will qualify even in 10-12 years. French
President Nicholas Sarkozy has heightened tensions
by making clear his fundamental opposition to Turkish
membership. The November 2007 progress report
of the European Commission highlighted the need
for Turkey to revamp Article 301 of its constitution,
which prohibits the criticism of “Turkishness,” clearly
an infringement of the Western ideal of free speech.
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The Turkish government has said it will do so, but
many more such reforms will be required before EU
membership will be achieved. Turkey’s frustration has
been heightened further by the lack of action within
the EU that address the long-standing Cyprus issue.1
Poor relations with the United States and uncertainty
over EU membership have added more pressures to
an already tense Turkish political situation. Turkey’s
domestic politics have become increasingly divisive
during the last few years, as the emergence of the
Justice and Development Party (AK Party or AKP)
has coincided with the decline of traditional secular
political parties and a reemergence of PKK terrorism.
The AKP came out of the July 2007 elections in a
stronger position and was able to elect Abdullah
Gül as president (after failing to do so in the spring
of 2007). But the new parliament also includes strong
representation by the major nationalist parties and a
number of Kurdish nationalist politicians. With the
traditional opposition in a weaker position, the stage
is set for even more polarization, especially given
growing nationalist concerns about the reforms needed
for EU accession.
This might seem an inauspicious time to launch a
new U.S.-Turkey partnership, given that the success
of that partnership may depend on Turkey’s internal
stability and relations with the EU. Yet these issues
also require a more positive U.S.-Turkey partnership
that will leave Turkey feeling less isolated from
its allies. The U.S.-Turkey relationship, Turkey’s
internal political development, and potential Turkish
accession to the European Union are thus inextricably
linked. Moreover, the challenges faced by the United
States, Turkey, and the EU—particularly the threat
of terrorism and political instability throughout the
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broader Middle East—demand that they find a new
basis for acting together now. Looking for constructive
ways to meet those challenges could provide the focus
and motivation for a new U.S.-Turkey relationship.
Washington and Ankara: Together Again?
U.S. and Turkish leaders recognize that the
bilateral relationship is in trouble, and have pledged
repeatedly to work toward improvement.2 To achieve
a stronger partnership, however, the first step must
be to understand the limits of the past. Turkish-U.S.
harmony during the Cold War was never as real as
is now nostalgically imagined. That relationship was
based primarily on narrow geopolitical considerations,
specifically, Turkey’s value as a strategically located
piece of real estate that offered an opportunity for the
United States and its allies to position themselves close
to Russia’s southern flank. U.S.-Turkish discussion was
often about the use of airbases or stationing of military
forces, while the relationship was largely managed by
the Turkish defense forces and the U.S. Department of
Defense. Turkey’s political and economic development
was often seen as secondary to its stability, and the
United States was viewed as tolerant of the Turkish
military’s interference in politics.
While the demise of the Soviet Union seemed to
reduce Turkey’s strategic value to the United States,
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, created
expectations that Turkey would regain its former
salience, especially after the United Statees began to
turn its sights on Saddam Hussein. The U.S. decision to
invade Iraq, however, actually set back the realization
of those hopes. The impending war was viewed with
alarm in Turkey, and the U.S. request to open a second
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front through Turkey was rejected by the parliament in
March 2003.
The war in Iraq has heightened Turkish fears
of instability in the region and contributed to the
precipitous drop in Turkish public support for the
United States. On the U.S. side, Turkey’s loyalty as
an ally now seems less assured, even though major
portions of U.S. equipment and personnel headed to
Iraq continue to go through Incirlik Airbase. As the U.S.
Government came to focus primarily on Iraq, attention
to Turkey has become episodic.
In an effort to reenergize the relationship, the State
Department and Turkish Foreign Ministry negotiated
a “Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue” in July
2006 that pledged cooperation on regional and global
challenges, and established regular bilateral meetings
to reinforce that cooperation. The two countries also
sought to collaborate in identifying secure sources of
energy supplies for the Euro-Atlantic region. Turkey
sees itself as a hub for the transfer of oil and natural
gas from Central Asia to the West, while the United
States, concerned about the growing dominance of
Russian-controlled energy supplies, was eager to find
new routes for pipelines.
Despite these efforts, U.S.-Turkey relations have
continued to be problematic. Consideration by the U.S.
House of Representatives of a resolution calling on the
Turkish government to acknowledge the Armenian
genocide caused extreme anxiety among Turkish
policymakers. The fact that the Bush administration
delayed mounting a strong effort against the resolution
until after it passed the House Foreign Affairs
Committee highlighted the lack of attention given to
Turkish issues within the U.S. Government and the lack
of a well-organized Turkish constituency in the United
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States. Although a Turkey caucus exists on Capitol
Hill, it cannot alone create broad-based support for the
U.S.-Turkey partnership.
The most difficult issue between Washington and
Ankara—one that many Turks see as a litmus test of
the bilateral relationship—is that of eliminating PKK
terrorist operations from northern Iraq into Turkey.
Turks charge that the Kurdish region of northern Iraq
(which has operated essentially autonomously since
the mid-1990s) has become a haven for PKK terrorists
and contend that the United States should ensure that
its Kurdish allies in Iraq are not supporting terrorist
attacks on Turkey and its citizens. The United States
has repeatedly made clear that it accepts the need to
stop PKK terrorism, and, accordingly, it appointed
General Joseph Ralston as a special envoy to Turkey
on the matter. Little progress was made, however, and
Ralston resigned in mid-2007. Following a PKK attack
in the fall of 2007 in southeastern Turkey that left 40
Turks dead, the Turkish parliament authorized military
action into northern Iraq. Such action was aimed at
destroying PKK bases and limiting PKK freedom of
movement, especially its ability to cross the border.
The U.S. administration sought to dissuade Turkey
from taking such action, and has called on the regional
government in northern Iraq to deal with the PKK but
there have been no clear results. Instead, there have
been reports of limited Turkish military actions in the
border area, mainly air attacks, but now the precedent
of a significant ground incursion has been established.
If the U.S.-Turkey relationship is to be put back on
track, both parties must take concrete steps along the
following lines:
• The U.S. Government must address the PKK
issue effectively. It is often forgotten by Turks
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that the United States played a crucial role in
apprehending Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the
PKK, in 1999. However, that was 9 years ago,
and the PKK has been rebuilding. The United
States has told its Kurdish allies that tolerating
havens on Iraqi soil for terrorist operations into
Turkey is not acceptable. The United States must
now push the Kurds to work with the Turkish
government to stop further cross-border PKK
operations. At the same time, the United States
should encourage the Turkish government to
begin a long-term process of reconciliation with
those in the indigenous Kurdish community
who have not engaged in terrorist acts. The
presence of Kurdish legislators in the new
Turkish parliament may provide a useful
opening, although there are certainly questions
about the relationship between their party, the
Democratic Society Party (DTP ), and the PKK.
Both the U.S. and Turkish governments must
work to broaden support for the relationship in
key constituencies. Congress in particular needs
to become more aware of Turkey’s contributions
as an ally, especially in Afghanistan, where it has
made a continuous military contribution to the
International Security Assistance Force-NATO,
Afghanistan (ISAF), with significant military
and civilian leadership roles. This might balance
the desire of Congress to respond to its Armenian constituents. Over the long term, the solution will be Turkish-Armenian reconciliation,
and the United States should do what it can to
encourage such a development. A broader U.S.Turkish civil dialogue is also required. Because
the benefits of such efforts become apparent
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only after a significant time lapse, plans for such
outreach should be developed very soon. In
Turkey, the government must be clearer about
not encouraging anti-American sentiments.
It should not, of course, restrict freedom of
expression, but it should be willing to provide
a balanced perspective when the popular press
and opinion shapers seem to embrace blatantly
anti-American stories.
The bilateral economic relationship should
be strengthened. Until recently, there was little
U.S. direct investment in Turkey. Since the 2001
economic crisis, Turkey has enjoyed significant
economic growth, usually at a rate over 7
percent each year. It has now become the 13th
largest economy in the world, and the seventh
largest in Europe (Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development [OECD] 2006
and 2005 figures). The well-educated but
inexpensive workforce and relatively open
access to the EU market should make Turkey
a good location for some U.S. companies. Some
progress in this direction has already been made.
In 2005, the United States was Turkey’s fourth
largest trading partner. In 2006, U.S. firms were
responsible for about 20 percent of foreign direct
investment (FDI) moving into Turkey, which
increased dramatically in 2005 ($9.6 billion total)
and 2006 ($17.2 billion) from previously low
levels (U.S. Government statistics). Of course,
governments have a limited role in encouraging
economic ties, but both governments would find
it helpful to have a larger business constituency
with a stake in stronger and more stable U.S.Turkish economic relations.
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The United States should take a more proactive
role in addressing the Cyprus issue. Too many
U.S. policymakers assume that since Cyprus
is an EU member and Turkey a candidate, the
Cyprus issue is now an internal EU matter.
However, since Cypriot membership gives it a
veto over even fairly small steps such as direct
assistance to the Turkish Cypriot community,
the EU is essentially impotent in this area.
Instead, the United States must use its position
on the United Nations (UN) Security Council to
push for a settlement, based either on a revived
Annan Plan or on another initiative by Secretary
General Ban Ki Moon

Turkey in Europe?
Rebuilding the Turkey–U.S. relationship will be
much easier if Turkey makes progress in its bid to
become an EU member. Turkey must prove that it
is able to implement the EU’s acquis communautaire,
the massive—and growing—body of EU laws and
regulations on everything from environmental protection to social welfare and beyond. This is a tall order,
and it will be 10-12 years before Turkey could reach
that point. Some areas of law have caused concern,
especially Turkish adherence to minority rights (e.g.,
as they affect the Kurdish population) and the continued existence of Turkish Article 301. Most Turks involved with the accession process realize that they
have much left to do, but they also have confidence,
along with their supporters in the EU, that they will
achieve the acquis in a reasonable time.
The European debate over Turkish accession has
raised some fundamental issues, however.3 These
are not about Turkey, but rather about what kind of
9

European Union will exist in the future. What will be
the final borders of the EU? Is the EU a Christian region?
Is it a place where all religions are openly practiced? Or
is it a region with strict divisions between religion and
public life? Some opponents of Turkish membership
doubt whether Turks share basic “European values”;
but what are those values, and how diverse and
inclusive should they be in an expanding Union?
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also
expects its members to share certain values. Turkey is
a long-time member of the Alliance. Is that an indicator
of appropriate values? Finally, Europe already has
a significant Muslim population, and by the time
decisions must be made about Turkey in 10 years or so,
that population will be even bigger. If Turkey’s status
as a Muslim country makes it impossible for Turkey
to join the Union, what are the implications for the
many Muslims who already live in the Union, or for
other candidate countries such as Bosnia, Albania, and
perhaps Kosovo?
Advocates of Turkish membership argue that
bringing Turkey into Europe’s body politic is
strategically important; it will anchor Turkey in the
West, and Turkey can be a vital bridge for Europe
to the wider Middle East. The EU already feels the
impact of the current conflicts in the broader Middle
East, including increased terrorism and immigration.
Europe is today very much involved through its role in
the Quartet and the participation of European troops
in Lebanon as part of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL). The EU is likely to play an increasingly active
role in the region, and having Turkey as a member
would provide greatly enhanced strategic weight and
regional credibility, according to this view. Others
argue, however, that admitting Turkey, which borders
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on Iraq and Syria, would bring the issues associated
with these two countries into immediate adjacency
with European space much more quickly. For them,
the preferred option is to keep Turkey out of the Union
and let it serve as a buffer between Europe and the
vexatious Middle East region.
The membership debate has contributed to a
growing Turkish skepticism, if not disillusionment,
concerning the EU. The percentage of Turks who believe
EU membership will be a good thing has declined
from 54 percent in 2006 to 40 percent in 2007. Turkish
resentment toward the Union has been compounded
by what many Turks regard as EU duplicity on the
subject of Cyprus. The AKP shifted the traditional
Turkish government position considerably (and risked
alienating the powerful national security forces) in
order to encourage the Turkish Cypriots to vote Yes
on the Annan Plan referendum in 2004. When the
Greek Cypriots voted No but were still permitted into
the Union, the Turks saw no penalties for the Greek
Cypriots in holding up a long-sought settlement.
When the Greek Cypriots—now members of the EU—
prevented the EU from allowing direct trade between
the Turkish Cypriots and the rest of the EU, Turkish
frustration and resentment grew even stronger.
One favorable note in Turkish-EU relations is the
growth in economic ties. For many in Turkey, the
primary motive in wanting to join the EU is to stabilize
the Turkish economy and attract foreign investment.
By any measure, that goal is already being realized.
To gain candidate status, the AKP began to open the
Turkish economy, and the results have been impressive.
Since 2001, EU exports to Turkey have grown at an
average annual rate of 20 percent, and the EU is now
Turkey’s largest trading partner. The EU accounts for
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approximately 80 percent of FDI in Turkey, with €5.6
billion in 2005 growing to €12 billion in 2006.
Improving the Turkey-EU relationship will not be
easy, as neither the membership issue nor the Cyprus
problem can be resolved in the short term. Given that
approval of EU accession will not come for at least
10 years and that Turkey will then face the need for
each member to ratify accession, the uncertainty about
Turkey’s EU prospects will continue to weigh on EUTurkey relations. Despite this difficult environment,
Turkey and the European Union can take some positive
steps to improve their relationship in the near term.
• As with the United States and Turkey,
the relationship must be broadened and
strengthened at the civil level. There is already
a huge Turkish diaspora in Germany, but
that is not the case in many other European
countries where Muslim immigrants tend to
come from Algeria, Pakistan, and elsewhere.
It is especially important that European parliamentary leaders—both on the national and
European level—be engaged in the effort to
make the public climate on this issue more
hospitable, as they will eventually be key to
ratification of the accession treaty. As with the
United States, ties between the EU and Turkish
business communities should be expanded.
Given the strong growth in the EU-Turkey
economic relationship, this should, without
great difficulty, create a valuable constituency
for improved relations and eventual accession.
• Turkey must reinvigorate its progress towards
meeting the EU acquis communautaire. With
the latest round of elections now over and
the issue of the presidency resolved, the AKP
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has a mandate to continue with its reform
policies. Perhaps most importantly, it must
take steps to amend Article 301, as the AKP
administration has pledged. The United States
can provide occasional discreet reminders to
the EU of the strategic importance of eventual
Turkish accession, but in the end Turkey will
not be admitted unless the European Union is
convinced that it can implement and enforce
EU laws.
• The membership rhetoric should be toned
down, both in Turkey and the European Union.
When EU leaders baldly state that Turkey will
never be a member or when Turkish politicians
infer that the EU is being duplicitous, it does
nothing but polarize public opinion and impede
the process of building stronger EU-Turkey
relations.
• Resolving the Cyprus issue would be the single
most important step the EU could take toward
improving relations with Turkey. Although
the EU has generally shown itself unable to take
bold steps if any one member state is strongly
opposed, it must find some way to break the
Greek Cypriot’s current hold on this issue. If
the EU is deadlocked, its members may have
to use other institutions, such as the UN or Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) to move forward, but they should
not allow the current situation to persist. The
new Cypriot president has pledged to restart
motibund reunification talks and to meet the
leader of the breakaway Turkish Cypriots. The
EU should give consideration to encouraging
these initiatives.
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Turkey against Itself?
The deterioration of U.S. and EU relations with
Turkey has coincided with increasing polarization in
Turkish domestic politics. Turkey is no stranger to
domestic political crises, having endured three military
coups (1960, 1971, and 1980) and the so-called “postmodernist coup” of 1997. While the era of military
coups seems past, observers of Turkish politics are
generally agreed that divisions within the country
are wide and growing. They differ, however, over the
nature of that polarization. Is the division between
Turkey’s traditional secular elite and an increasingly
powerful Islam-rooted AKP? Or is it between those
who seek to reform and modernize Turkish democracy
and a mixture of nationalist forces that are increasingly
resistant to the European impulse?
Since the AKP came to power in 2002, it has
actively pursued a reform agenda designed to meet the
criteria for EU accession. The AKP has also overseen
a significant improvement in Turkey’s economy,
although unemployment is still high. But while the
AKP leadership describes the party as comparable to
the Christian Democratic Party of Germany, many of
its critics fear “creeping Islamicization,” and look to
attempts to criminalize adultery and allow graduates
of religious schools to attend university as efforts
to overturn Turkey’s traditional secularism. With a
traditional secularist, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, as president,
the AKP administration faced limits on its legislation
and appointments. But when Foreign Minister Gul
became a candidate for president, the general staff
of the Turkish military—which regards itself as the
protector of Turkey’s Kemalist-style secular political
system—twice issued veiled warnings about the
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threat his election might pose to that traditional order.
Nevertheless, the AKP won the July 2007 election,
demonstrating that many Turks did not believe its
particular brand of political Islam was a threat to
Turkish stability.
As the AKP was expanding its hold on government,
the opposition was also experiencing a fundamental
realignment. The main opposition party, the Republican
People’s Party, led by Deniz Baykal has struggled.
Prior to the 2007 elections, few observers saw it as an
effective alternative capable of displacing the Erdogan
government, despite its success in mobilizing supporters for large demonstrations against the prospect of
a Gul presidency. In the election, its portion of the
popular vote rose very slightly, from 19.4 percent to
20.8, but its share of seats fell by 66 to 112.
The most significant electoral growth was experienced by the Nationalist Movement Party, which
entered the parliament for the first time, crossing the
10 percent threshold with 14.3 percent and gaining 71
seats. This group is increasingly skeptical of Turkey’s
bid for EU membership, and is especially concerned
that EU accession will require Turkey to forfeit control
over its own national identity and policies. Unlike the
traditional secularist parties, this group presented
an alternative presidential candidate, Sabahattin
Cakmakoglu, who stood against Gul in the August
elections. This gesture was largely symbolic as there
was no chance he would be elected, but it did indicate
a willingness to offer active opposition.
In another notable political change, 18 Kurdish
nationalists were elected to parliament after running
as independents. Given the current tensions over PKK
terrorism and the suspicions over the relationship
between their party, the DTP, and the PKK, it is
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unclear whether they can provide effective political
representation for Turkey’s Kurdish citizens. The AKP
also garnered significant support among the Kurdish
minority in the recent elections, winning numerous
constituencies in the southeast.
Although these political changes have strong
domestic roots, they also have been prompted by
tensions in Turkey’s relations with the EU and the
United States. As Turkey’s efforts to align its laws
with those of the EU begin to affect domestic law
enforcement, economic regulations, and minority
relations, there has been an increase in support for
nationalist political parties that are skeptical of the EU
process. Many in Turkey, including in the military, see
the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 as partly responsible
for the reinvigoration of the PKK and for creating
enormous potential instability on Turkey’s borders.
This view has added to the rise of nationalism in
Turkey, as many in the political elite conclude that
traditional friends, such as the United States and other
NATO allies, no longer take Turkey’s interests into
account.
NATO: Collateral Damage or Touchstone?
The deterioration of Turkey’s relations with the
European Union and the United States has also had a
negative impact on NATO. This has not been Turkey’s
intention; indeed, Turkey has long been an active and
constructive member of the Alliance. Since joining
NATO in 1952, Turkey has been one of the most active
nations in terms of its military contributions, with
significant participation in both Balkan missions and
Afghanistan. Unlike many member nations, Turkey
has met—and usually exceeded—Alliance targets for
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military spending. Turkey has one of the largest military
forces in NATO, albeit one primarily configured for
territorial defense (a necessity given the threat from
PKK operations), rather than rapid deployment outside
its borders.4
During the Cold War, Turkey provided a strong
anchor for NATO in the West, while NATO addressed
Turkey’s security needs vis-à-vis its immediate
neighbors. When the EU began to develop its Common
Foreign and Security Policy, Turkey reached out to the
EU’s defense arm, the Western European Union, and
negotiated arrangements that effectively gave Ankara
a “seat at the table” when its security interests were
involved. The emergence of the EU’s European Security
and Defense Policy after the 1998 St. Malo meeting
disturbed this arrangement, at least in the view of the
Turkish government. A potentially powerful security
alliance was emerging in Europe, and Turkey, as a
nonmember, had no way to ensure that it would avoid
acting against Turkish interests.
Turkey responded to this shift by drawing closer to
the EU, reinvigorating its membership bid and becoming a significant contributor to EU military operations.
Turkey also insisted that cooperation between NATO
and the EU should be authorized in a way that allowed
a NATO member to block a consensus that might
threaten its interests. Turkey’s position has effectively
stymied any NATO-EU discussions of such issues
as Darfur, energy security, anti-terrorism, and other
matters lacking immediate operational significance for
the Alliance. Turkey’s frustration with the EU over the
Cyprus issue has determined it to maintain this NATO
member veto, which the Turkish government sees as
its only form of leverage. The U.S. Government has
been reluctant to press Turkey to lift its block, given
the other tensions in the relationship.
17

Clearly the way forward is to find a resolution
to the Turk-Greek division of Cyprus. Until that
happens, however, Turkey is likely to feel obligated
to restrict discussions about NATO-EU cooperation.
Yet the demand for such cooperation is growing, in
Afghanistan and elsewhere. If NATO-EU cooperation
does not become easier, NATO may find itself excluded
from acting on many issues where cooperation with
the EU is necessary, and in that case U.S.-European
cooperation generally is likely to suffer.
Despite this difficulty, NATO still provides
opportunities for reinforcing Turkey’s importance to
Europe and the United States, and for rebuilding those
relations. NATO is now operating more than ever in
Turkey’s immediate neighborhood. And as NATO
reaches out to the Balkans and beyond to Georgia,
Turkey should be encouraged to take a leadership role
in strengthening Alliance ties with these neighbors.
Ankara can then ensure that such outreach takes due
account of its interests, while also working closely
with the United States in making NATO a stabilizing
influence throughout the Black Sea and Caucasus
region.
Building New Partnerships.
The U.S.-Turkey partnership must be rebuilt. A
stronger partnership will relieve the isolation that leads
Turkey to defend its interests so intently within NATO.
A stronger partnership will also benefit the United
States—Turkey, along with most of its neighborhood,
is of vital importance to U.S. national security. In many
ways, Turkey is now more important to the achievement of U.S. strategic objectives than it was during the
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Cold War. Turkey could play an especially vital role
in three areas: enhancing energy security; restraining
Islamic radicalism and terrorism; and stabilizing the
wider Middle East region.
Strengthening the Washington-Ankara link will
require restoring trust in the EU-Turkey relationship.
Because the Turkish leadership looks to the U.S.
Government as an advocate for its European ambitions,
the success of the U.S.-Turkish relationship will be
judged in part by Turkey’s progress toward joining
Europe. Moreover, Europe has as much at stake
as Turkey and the United States—if not more—in
meeting the challenges of energy security, terrorism,
and instability in the Middle East. A trilateral U.S.-EUTurkey approach to these issues could be especially
effective.
The Bush administration has taken a step toward
restoring the U.S.-Turkey relationship by fostering
Turkey’s development as a transit hub for oil and
natural gas. Turkey has long been an important conduit
for oil shipments, primarily on tankers through the
Bosphorus. The environmental consequences have
already been severe, and an accident involving an oil
or, in the future, liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanker,
could be devastating. Moreover, the Bosphorus is
already one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world,
and there is little capacity, if any, for additional traffic.
Thus, Turkish ambitions for becoming an even more
important transit hub have focused on the construction
of oil and gas pipelines.
There are several schemes for oil and gas pipelines,
some of which are under construction and others only
in the planning stages. The Blue Stream and South
Caucasus gas pipelines opened in 2005 and 2006,
respectively, while the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceylan (BTC) oil
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pipeline opened in 2005. Most planned and recent
pipelines are designed to bring Russian oil and gas to
Turkey across the Black Sea, or to deliver Caucasus
oil and gas across Turkey (as would the Nabucco gas
pipeline and BTC). In some cases, these pipelines could
also deliver Iranian oil and gas through Turkey—a
prospect causing the U.S. Government to hesitate in
supporting these ventures. But as concern about the
dominance of Russia in European oil and gas markets
has grown, so has U.S. support for these other efforts,
especially when they provide alternatives to Russian
supplies.
Turkey’s role as a transit hub for oil and natural
gas is not simply of interest to the United States. The
EU and its member states have an enormous stake in
the growth and diversification of energy supplies in the
region. Ever since the Russian government temporarily
stopped the flow of gas to Ukraine in early 2006, EU
leaders have made clear that diversifying supplies
away from Russia is a priority (Russia currently
provides approximately 25 percent of EU oil and gas
supplies). Thus, the EU has great interest in Turkey’s
success in transporting oil and natural gas from its
eastern borders to Europe. The United States, aside
from its own interest in seeing more oil and gas reach
the world market, also has an interest in relieving its
European allies of their dependency on one source of
supply.
Clearly this is an area in which the United States,
Turkey, and the EU should be able to work together.
They all have an interest in diversifying oil and gas
supplies, especially while boosting the economies of
the Caucasus and eastern Turkey. The business case for
each pipeline must be strong enough to attract private
investors, but the governments, especially if working
together, can foster corporate partnerships and help
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reduce the level of risk. A strong trilateral partnership
in this effort would increase U.S. and especially EU
energy security, while also strengthening the U.S. and
EU case for a stable and westward-leaning Turkey.
Trilateral cooperation in energy security is only a
partial response to the need to rebuild the U.S.-EUTurkish relationship. Two other issues stand out for
their potential in strengthening trilateral cooperation:
terrorism and the Middle East region. The United
States, the EU, and Turkey share a very real interest in
seeing a decline in terrorism, especially that based on
radical Islam. They also share an interest in building
a more stable Middle East, one whose politics are no
longer dominated by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or
threatened by potential Iranian nuclear proliferation.
Terrorism as a Unifying Force.
The United States, EU, and Turkey each have a
very different experience with terrorism, which is
reflected in their policy responses. For the United
States, a limited experience with domestic terrorism
was suddenly overtaken by the catastrophic attacks
of September 11, 2001, catapulting the issue of radical
Islamist terrorism to the top of the national agenda.
Although U.S. personnel abroad had been targeted
before 2001 (and there had been a failed bombing of
the World Trade Center), terrorism became a reality
for most Americans with shocking suddenness. U.S.
success in driving al-Qaeda’s sponsors, the Taliban, out
of power in Afghanistan and the U.S. administration’s
focus on fighting the “war on terrorism” overseas
reflected a military and national security orientation in
the U.S. response.
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In Europe, long experience with different forms
of national terrorism (the IRA, ETA, Bader Meinhoff,
etc.) led to an emphasis on law enforcement as the
primary response. Although Europe has suffered some
significant terrorist attacks, it has experienced no level
of mass casualties equivalent to that of the World Trade
Center. The arrival of al-Qaeda in Europe has raised
the stakes, however, with the London and Madrid
bombings causing serious loss of life. Al-Qaeda’s
apparent success in recruiting European citizens to
carry out terrorist attacks has caused considerable
concern.
Following the 2001 attacks, many European
governments sent troops to the U.S.-led war in
Afghanistan and later supported NATO’s role in that
country. Nevertheless, most European political leaders
reject the term “war on terror.” Despite these different
perspectives, the United States and EU member states
have developed significant cooperation in intelligence
and law enforcement aimed at fighting terrorism. They
have also taken the lead at the UN and elsewhere in
imposing financing restrictions and other measures
that have been key in reducing state support for terrorist groups.
Turkey has suffered more casualties from terrorism
than either the United States or the EU; Turkish
government officials often cite a figure of 35,000
dead from PKK actions. Most terrorist acts within
Turkey or against Turkish officials have been at
the hands of nationalist groups such as the PKK or
Armenians. In recent years, Turkey has suffered a few
attacks by “religious terrorists,” i.e., those motivated
by fundamentalist conceptions of Islam, including
al-Qaeda operatives. Given the strict traditional
secularism of the Turkish government in a country
that is more than 90 percent Muslim, it is surprising
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that Turkey has not been more of a target. Certainly
most Turkish politicians and analysts believe that their
country is on the front line in the battle against Islamic
extremism.
Turkey has responded differently to these two
distinctive types of terrorism. In dealing with “religious
terrorism,” the Turkish government has used its
authority to limit the growth of radicalism and focused
on the role of mosques. The Turkish government has
long taken a role in training imams and overseen the
content of weekly sermons. The government has also
sought to avoid entering mosques when in pursuit of
terrorists, and has generally kept its efforts within a
law enforcement paradigm. In responding to the PKK,
however, the government has employed a much more
military-based strategy. Past government efforts to
root out support for Kurdish separatist terrorists led to
a civil war and military occupation of the southeastern
region of the country, which is heavily dominated by
the Kurdish minority. With PKK bases now established
in northern Iraq, the Turkish military is massed on the
border and poised to take further action against those
camps if it becomes necessary.
To date, the perceived failure of the United States to
take actions against the PKK in Iraq has been a major
irritant in the Turkey-U.S. relationship. It is time for
the United States to ensure that there is no safe haven
for PKK terrorists in Iraq, and it should be prepared
to press the regional government of northern Iraq to
suppress or control the activities of the PKK on its
territory. At the same time, the United States must
also encourage the Turks and Kurds to embark on a
process of reconciliation. Obviously, this is easier said
than done. In any event, the U.S. Government should
examine how U.S.-Turkish cooperation against radical
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Islamic terrorism might be strengthened, whether
through greater sharing of intelligence or enhanced
cooperation between federal and Turkish police and
investigative agencies generally. Turkey-EU efforts to
cooperate against terrorism have been slightly more
successful. Anti-terrorist financial rules have made it
more difficult for the PKK to raise funds in Europe, but
Turkish officials do not yet regard these measures as
sufficient. There are other opportunities for TurkeyEU cooperation in this area, ranging from enhanced
law enforcement and judicial cooperation to sharing
“best practices” in encouraging mosques to be places
of worship rather than political radicalization.
Working Together for a Stable Middle East.
The United States and the EU have long been
active—both separately and together—in looking for
solutions to the tensions of the wider Middle East
region. Although U.S. and European views of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict are often very different, they
have sought through the Quartet and other mechanisms to find steps toward a solution. Most recently,
the EU and several member states were participants
in the U.S.-sponsored Annapolis peace conference. The
United States and the EU have also worked together to
find a way to reduce Syrian influence in the Lebanese
government.
Despite statements at U.S.-EU and G-8 summits to
the contrary, transatlantic cooperation has been less
obvious in pushing for political, economic, and social
reform in the region, and there are some differences
over the desirability of such a course, given the risks
posed by Islamic extremists. While the United States
and the EU have cooperated closely on the issue of
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Iranian nuclear weaponization, they split into several
different camps over the issues posed by Iraq. Despite
U.S. and European efforts, however, the wider Middle
East region has, if anything, become less stable and
more conflict-prone in the last few years. The prospect
of a significant U.S. reduction in troop strength in Iraq
after the next U.S. presidential election adds another
element of uncertainty and potential risk.
Turkey has taken its own approach toward its
neighboring region.5 During the Cold War, the Turkish
government focused on the threat from the Soviet
Union rather than any challenge from its Middle
Eastern neighbors. This perspective was reinforced
by the Kemalist tendency to emphasize connections
with the West over the historical Ottoman ties to the
Middle East. But the 1990-91 Iraq war led to economic
hardship for many Turks with business ties in Iraq,
convincing Turkish leaders that they should protect
their own interests in the region rather than relying on
the United States.
Since then, Ankara has reached out to build a wide
network of relationships. For example, while maintaining its support for Israel, it has invited representatives of Hamas to Ankara for discussions and maintained correct relations with the Syrian government.
Prior to the Annapolis meeting, both Israeli Foreign
Minister Shimon Peres and Palestinian President
Mahmoud Abbas visited Turkey and spoke before the
parliament. Ankara has also maintained cooperative
ties with Iran, as both have large Kurdish populations
and are concerned about the potential spillover effects
of an autonomous Kurdish state in northern Iraq. At
the same time, however, Turkish government officials
are concerned about Iranian nuclear weaponization,
especially since Turkey is already within range of
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Iranian missiles. Perhaps Turkey’s biggest concern,
however, is the power vacuum likely to develop if Iraq
becomes embroiled in a civil war.
Turkey’s increased activism in the region should
not be interpreted as an alternative to cooperative ties
with the United States and Europe in dealings with
the Middle East, but rather as a diversification of its
foreign policy approach. In fact, this expanding role
puts Turkey in a better position for contributing to
transatlantic efforts to stabilize the broader Middle
East. The AKP in particular is well-placed to help
more moderate political organizations in neighboring
countries, such as Fatah, understand what is required to
develop public support in a democratic environment.
Turkey’s wide range of regional contacts may also be
useful in expanding the debate about the region and
developing comprehensive approaches. And while
Turkey has sometimes been regarded with suspicion
in the region due to the hegemonic tendencies of its
Ottoman heritage, it now has more credibility in the
region than does the United States.
Given the assets that Turkey brings to the table—
economic, diplomatic, and political—the United States
and the EU should reach out to engage Ankara more
fully in the region. Such an effort could be especially
important once the Israeli-Palestinian process initiated
at Annapolis is fully underway. Turkey has a huge
interest in having a stable neighborhood. Accordingly,
the Turkish foreign policy elite sees their country
playing an increasing role, whether in cooperation
with the U.S. and EU or not. Turkey may be lukewarm
toward some of the American ambitions for change in
the region, but it is not unlike the EU in that regard.
Working with Turkey will help ensure that U.S., EU,
and Turkish activities in the region are compatible.
Although there are likely to be some disagreements,
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such cooperation will also strengthen the Turkish
relationship with the United States and Europe. At the
very least, it will demonstrate that the United States
and the EU take Turkey seriously on an agenda of
prime importance to this key ally.
New Partnerships for the Future?
The United States and the EU have already
compiled an impressive record of cooperation in antiterrorism and the Middle East peace process. They
are not always unified in their views or actions, but
they have established mechanisms—including the
Policy Dialogue on Borders and Transport Security
as well as the Quartet—that bring them together on
a regular basis to identify joint steps forward. For
the most part, Turkey has been outside this circle
of cooperation. Given Turkey’s large stake in both
fighting terrorism and maintaining a stable Middle East
region, supplementing the familiar U.S.-EU dialogue
with trilateral U.S.-EU-Turkey discussions would be
beneficial to all. Turkey would bring considerable
assets to these discussions—from extensive experience
in dealing with political Islam to a wealth of contacts
throughout the Middle East. By using those assets and
working together, Turkey, the United States, and the
EU are more likely to be effective in making progress
against terrorism and regional instability. Such
cooperation will help foster an EU-Turkey relationship
that is not totally dependent on the ups and downs
of the accession process, and it may even teach some
skeptics the value of working with Turkey.
Granted, U.S.-Turkey cooperation on these issues
is likely to be difficult, as it will resurrect the very
issues that have been so divisive in the recent past.
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Despite those differences, however, Turkey and the
United States share an overriding interest in fighting
terrorism and reducing instability and conflict in the
wider Middle East. By working together—and with
the EU—to pursue their joint interests, Ankara and
Washington can reinvigorate their relationship and
reinforce a new post-Cold War basis for a sustainable
U.S.-Turkey partnership.
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CHAPTER 2
THE STATE OF U.S.-TURKEY RELATIONS:
A TURKISH PERSPECTIVE
O. Faruk Loğoğlu
Introduction.
Developing policy recommendations on the relationship between any two states requires first an
understanding of the nature and characteristics of that
relationship, as well as a sound appraisal of its current
setting. The chances of making that relationship work
are likely to be slim and mostly accidental unless
there is a prior appreciation of its foundations and its
capacity to adjust to changing conditions, as well as
an understanding of whether the national interests
and priorities of the sides coincide. Similarly, to chart
its future, one must know where a relationship stands
today and how it got there. Awareness of the constraints
and the opportunities present in the relationship today
is essential for realizing its potential at an optimum
level tomorrow.
In the sections that follow, I first establish the main
features of the relationship between Turkey and the
United States, then look at the current state of that
relationship, and finally propose specific steps and
measures for its enhancement and sustenance in the
future.
The Nature of Turkish-American Relations.
We should note at the outset that the U.S.-Turkey
relationship is a special one. The two countries are
formal allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
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(NATO), the only such alliance the United States
has with a Muslim country. The soldiers of the two
countries have waged wars together in defense of
freedom in foreign lands. However, despite that core
solidarity, their relationship has been beset from
time to time by specific issues that have considerably
undermined its energy and performance. For example,
in the mid-1960s, the Cyprus issue, and in the early
1970s, the dispute over poppy cultivation in Turkey,
sapped much of the relationship’s strength. In the mid1970s, following its military intervention in Cyprus,
Turkey had to face a U.S. arms embargo.
The relationship between Turkey and the United
States rests on a solid foundation in terms of common
values and shared ideals. Commitment to and respect
for democracy, the rule of law, human rights and
freedom, economic prosperity, and national security
bind the two nations strongly together. Both are
dynamic societies that seek their golden age not in
the past, but in the future. It is these shared values
and attitudes that have kept the two countries close
together, enabling the relationship to withstand the
vicissitudes and tests of time.
In addition ot the serious disputes noted above,
the relationship has survived other crises, including
the 1962 missile deal in the wake of the Cuban crisis,
the 1964 Lyndon Johnson letter, and the March 1,
2003, decision of the Turkish parliament refusing use
of Turkish soil as a U.S. venue for invading Iraq. The
Cuban crisis between the United States and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was resolved
through a deal behind Turkey’s back, entailing the
removal of Russian missiles from Cuba in exchange
for the removal of U.S. missiles deployed in Turkey
as a NATO country. The Turks were never consulted
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about the deal. When in 1964, Turkey threatened to
intervene in Cyprus to help the Turkish Cypriots facing
ethnic cleansing by the Greek Cypriots, U.S. President
Johnson sent a letter to the Turkish prime minister,
warning him that if the Soviet Union attacked Turkey
to protect the Greek Cypriots, the United States and
NATO allies might not—contrary to their obligations
under the NATO Treaty—come to Turkey’s defense.
In 1974, when Turkey did indeed intervene in Cyprus,
the United States imposed an arms embargo which
took almost 2 years of effort to remove. However, the
most severe blow to Turkish-American relations to
date came in early 2003, when the Turkish Parliament
failed to approve the entry of U.S. troops into northern
Iraq from Turkey. All of these crises worked to the
detriment of the relationship and resulted in loss of
mutual confidence, requiring in turn much time and
effort to repair.
The Turkish-American relationship is well-endowed and richly textured, but it does have a major weakness: the economic dimension is not strong enough.
The amount of trade between the two countries is not
nearly commensurate with the size of their economies.
The number of American tourists visiting Turkey is
small. U.S. investments in Turkey are still limited and
investors hesitant. Turkish business executives, on the
other hand, prefer markets more familiar and closer
to home. Without a strong mutual economic stake in
the relationship, it will remain fragile, ever vulnerable
to the tensions and crises which normally arise in any
close state-to-state association.
The relationship is asymmetric. Turkey is a
regional power with outreach into several adjacent
areas including the Balkans and Central Asia. Turkish
interests, concerns, priorities, and timelines are
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primarily shaped by localized perceptions and are
processed within a framework whose references are
regional. Turkish regional concerns and perspectives
are much more detailed and sophisticated in comparison to those of the United States, whose perceptions,
being global, are manifested in broad strokes. The
United States is a superpower whose interests and
needs are calculated on a planetary scale, meaning
it is generally not fine-tuned to the sensitivities of a
regional actor like Turkey. Moreover, whereas Turkish
foreign policy requirements change more slowly, U.S.
concerns and priorities shift and evolve much more
rapidly.
Thus, when U.S. views are communicated to the
Turks, they do not always sit well with the Turkish
mindset. For the United States, its requests are
always important and of high priority. But because
the relationship is asymmetrical, what is crucial and
immediate for the Turkish side generally does not carry
the same importance or urgency for the Americans. In
short, U.S. demands and expectations from Turkey
are presented as if they are sacrosanct while Turkish
needs and priorities are treated by the United States
as only one small voice in a chorus of importunate
petitioners.
The Turkish-American relationship is a sensitive
and fragile one. It is easily sidetracked by specific
events or careless comments of political leaders and
public officials on both sides, or by commentary in the
news media or even the movies. When ill-nurtured and
left to fend for itself, the relationship underperforms.
It is a relationship under permanent siege on the U.S.
side. The Turkish-American connection faces constant
attack by the hostile Armenian Diaspora and Greek
and Greek-Cypriot lobbies. Their political and financial
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influence impedes freedom of action and clouds the
judgment of American politicians and administrations
in their dealings with Turkey, holding the relationship
hostage to the interplay of domestic politics. Similarly,
they affect the outlook of Turkish leaders toward
Washington. U.S. decisions and actions, especially
if they are linked to Turkish-Armenian or TurkishGreek issues, are often—and generally with good
reason—viewed by the Turkish political establishment
with suspicion for being under the undue influence of
Armenian and Greek lobbies. There is thus an element
of chronic suspicion and distrust in the Turkish mindset
about U.S. decisionmakers.
One other feature of the U.S.-Turkey connection is
that it is slow in adjusting to change, both in the bilateral
relationship as well as in the international setting.
Foreign policy considerations underwent important
changes in both countries in the post-Cold War setting,
again in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 (9/11),
and once again after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.
The different rates of adjustment by the two sides to
changing conditions have further exacerbated the
problem, resulting in missed opportunities. The United
States, with global concerns and other priorities, failed
to put its weight behind a Cyprus settlement in the
1980s, gave only measured support to Turkey’s fight
against PKK terrorism in the late 1980s and the 1990s,
and misjudged in 2003 what Turkey could deliver on
Iraq. Turkey, on the other hand, mired in disputes with
its neighbors and caught in the temporary euphoria
of Turkic solidarity in those early days, missed the
opportunity to develop a broad partnership with the
United States in the Caucasus and Central Asia in the
wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse.
Since the end of the Cold War, Turkish-U.S.
relations have witnessed a slow and subtle shift in their
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essentials. This shift entails a relative decrease in the
importance of the military-defense-security or “hard
power” dimension of the relationship and an increase
in the importance of energy issues and matters of
civilization, culture, religion, democracy, secularism,
and gender equality, or “soft power” factors in the
relationship. Turkey and the United States have not
yet properly adjusted to this significant shift in their
relations. Turkey wants to project its soft power assets,
especially to the European Union (EU), while it still
views its relationship with the United States more in
terms of hard power needs and requirements. The
United States, on the other hand, understands Turkey’s
true value as a democracy with a Muslim population
in the context of the “clash of civilizations,” but still
relates to Turkey more in strategic and military terms.
The relationship is also constrained by the fact that
while the national interests and foreign policy goals of
the two nations on matters of mutual concern coincide
and overlap, they are often not identical. Combined
with the fact of common values, the convergence of national interests usually gives the relationship a strategic
character that provides a suitable environment for close
ties and cooperation. But to the extent that there are
differences in those interests, real or perceived, they
keep Turkey and the United States from cooperating
productively.
The State of Turkish-American Relations.
The Turkish-American relationship is today in
convalescence. Recovery is slowed by well-known
make-or-break issues, especially surrounding the U.S.
response to the PKK terrorist group and repeated
resolutions by the U.S. Congress concerning Turkish-
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Armenian relations. These ailments drain the relationship of its energy proper and keep it from branching out
into areas where the two nations could productively
work together. The relationship has also been badly
sprained by the events over Iraq. Its recovery in the
aftermath of the March 2003 decision of the Turkish
parliament was better than expected, but it received
further blows from U.S. failure to act against the PKK in
Iraq. Incidents such as the detention of Turkish troops
by U.S. forces in Süleymaniye during the initial phase
of the Iraq war and the subsequent movie, “The Valley
of the Wolves,” did not help. Neither did certain public
statements of leaders and officials of both sides.
Full recovery consequently looks like a rather
distant prospect, in a context of persistently high
anti-American sentiments in Turkish public opinion.
Opposition to U.S. policies in Iraq is at its highest (more
than 75 percent) in Turkey while support for the United
States is at the lowest (under 10 percent). The outcomes
of the presidential and general elections in Turkey in
2007 stiffened Turkish attitudes, official and otherwise,
toward the United States (and the EU). If, in addition to
failing to meet Turkish expectations regarding the PKK
presence and activities in Iraq, Armenian resolutions
reemerge in the U.S. Congress, the Turkish-American
relationship is likely to suffer substantial damage.
Coupled with diminishing Turkish support for EU
membership and the proclivities of the Turkish Justice
and Development Party (AKP) leadership, even the
overall direction of Turkish foreign policy alignment
might temporarily come under question.
The precise impact AKP’s victory in the elections on
Turkish-U.S. relations is not yet entirely clear. Prime
Minister Erdoğan is trying to keep the atmospherics
friendly. If he succeeds in demonstrating to the Turkish
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public that Washington is truly helping Turkey in its
struggle against Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (Kurdish
Workers Party or PKK) terror and keeps the Armenian
issue off the agenda of the U.S. Congress, then the
Turkish-U.S. relationship could, in the short run,
experience some sense of normalcy. But the texture
of the Turkish-U.S. relationship is likely to weaken
over the medium term for reasons related to internal
developments in Turkey. The AKP can be expected
to pursue an Islamist agenda more aggressively and
with greater impunity than before. There are already
ample signs of such a trend. Such a dynamic would
be perceived and resisted adamantly by the prodemocracy forces and secularists as a threat to Turkish
democracy and its underpinning, the principle of
secularism.
An AKP majority in the parliament may not,
therefore, necessarily translate into political stability
if those members interpret their mandate as a license
to enhance the role, place, and visibility of religion in
state and society. The paramount goal for all concerned
is the preservation and sustenance of both democracy
and secularism in Turkey, because without secularism
Turkish democracy will be gravely weakened. The
choice for the United States could come to be between
supporting a secular and democratic Turkey or
watching Turkey steadily transform into a “moderate
Islamic state.”
Despite its cloudy state, the Turkish-U.S. relationship remains a strategic one because the two nations possess a substantial mutual capacity to collaborate on a
wide spectrum of regional and transnational issues.
Neither country is indispensable to the other, but both
need each other in the current international setting and
are poised to reap significant benefits if they can join
their assets.
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Guidelines and Policy Recommendations.
Repairing the relationship will take much hard
work by both the United States and Turkey. They must
both undertake the following first steps:
• To develop greater awareness of the current
state of the relationship, both sides should
seek a better understanding of the nature of
the relationship, including its asymmetry and
its sensitivities. They must work to identify
what is truly important to the other side so that
priorities are properly and realistically set and
matched.
• Leaders and officials should affirm and underline at every appropriate opportunity the
importance of the bonds between the two
nations. They should consult each other before
taking significant decisions of interest to the
other side—a mere exchange of views is not
enough. They must also be straightforward in
identifying points of disagreement as well as of
agreement. They should rely on official channels
of communication, rather than communicating
through the news media.
• Both sides should use the mechanisms identified
in the July 5, 2006, “Shared Vision” document,
signed by Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül and
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. The two
should engage in “expert level” and “policy
planning” consultations and particularly
encourage the “broad-based dialogue” called
for in the document, designed to diversify
the relationship through participation of civil
society, business, news media, and the legislative
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bodies of both sides. The annual “high level
review” at the level of under secretaries and
regular contacts at the political level should be
held to make sure that the relationship is kept
on track.
To rebuild the military/defense relationship, a
key element in the past, they should together
review the state of defense/military relations
in all its aspects, including improving weapons
and equipment procurement procedures.
They should try to enhance foreign policy
cooperation, with special emphasis on the
red button issues of our times, particularly
terrorism.
A special effort must be made to strengthen
the economic dimension. This should entail,
inter alia, fostering more trade, investment,
and tourism, and also reviving the Qualified
Industrial Zones initiative.
The relationship urgently needs diversification.
The United States and Turkey should encourage
more exchange and cultural programs, with an
emphasis on cooperation in the field of higher
education and on civil society interaction.
Cooperation in science and technology would
especially benefit from the inclusion of the
high profile community of Turkish American
scientists and scholars in the United States.
Finally, it would be useful to establish joint
specialized bodies, including state and civil
society components, for countering cultural and
religious clashes and conflicts, and promoting
harmony among civilizations.
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In addition, the United States must move forward in
the following ways:
• Most importantly, take credible and concrete
steps to help end the PKK presence and activities
in Iraq. In addition, Washington should restate
its commitment to Iraq’s territorial integrity
and work to discourage Kurdish separatism
in that country. It should encourage continued
delay or cancellation of the Kirkuk referendum,
given that Kirkuk is the centerpiece of the Iraqi
Kurds’ strategy to break away from Iraq.
• On regional issues, engage Turkey more
actively in the Middle East Peace Process and
particularly support Turkish-Israeli-Palestinian
trilateral cooperative undertakings. Turkey
and the United States should continue to exert
joint efforts to promote democracy, the rule of
law, and human rights in the Middle East and
in Central Asia. At the same time, the United
States must also allow elbow room to Turkey
in its dealings with Iran and Syria. The United
States should be clear and honest about its
intentions regarding Iran and assure Turkey
that if any military action is to be taken against
Iran, there will be no requests made of Turkey
to facilitate any such action.
• Resubmission of Armenian resolutions in the
Congress should be discouraged. In contacts
with Congress, the White House ought to be
clear about its opposition to the adoption of any
resolution supporting Armenian allegations of
genocide and engage the Congress accordingly.
In keeping with this imperative, the Congress
must become better informed and educated
about the Armenian issue. Members of Congress
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should be encouraged to visit Turkey for factfinding and consultations. Without taking sides
on the issue, the United States should insist on
and help devise means for dialogue between
Turkey and Armenia as well as between Turks
and Armenians. To encourage this reconciliation, the United States should energize
peacemaking efforts to settle the Nagorno
Karabagh problem and make Turkey a more
active partner.
Avoid skepticism about the development of
Turkish-Russian relations—the Turks know
the limits. In fact, the United States should
work with Turkey to help Georgia resolve its
internal conflicts and its problems with Russia.
The United States should also encourage the
strengthening of ties between Turkey and
Ukraine, a pivotal country in the European
setting.
Help and promote Turkey as an energy corridor
and distribution terminal for oil and gas from
the Caspian region, Central Asia, and the
Middle East, and maintain support generally
for the Turkish economy.
Be more forthcoming on Cyprus by engaging
the Turkish Cypriots and by urging an overall
settlement through the good offices of the
United Nations (UN) secretary general.
Provide active and sustained support for
Turkey’s EU membership.
Keep NATO strong; disallow any effort to
undermine or supplant it.
Support and promote Turkey’s candidacy for
UN Security Council membership in 2009.
Avoid interfering or creating the impression
of interference in Turkey’s domestic politics.
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Above all, avoid involvement in internal
Turkish debates on matters of religion, religious
sects, secularism, and nationalism, but instead
take the general position that these are issues
for Turkish democracy to handle.
Turkey must also work hard at reinforcing and
strengthening the relationship. It should:
• Offer ideas and advice on regional issues
of common concern. It should be especially
proactive about its role in resolving regional
conflicts in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and
the Balkans. As the same time, it should be sure
to coordinate the Turkish role more closely with
U.S. efforts. It should not attempt or appear to
mediate on behalf of the United States unless
it is specifically requested to do so, but instead
should act as a facilitator to enhance the quality
of communication and understanding between
the United States and its interlocutors in Turkey’s various neighboring regions, particularly
with regard to Iran and Syria.
• Work with the United States in forging closer
ties between the Caucasus and Central Asian
countries and the transatlantic community. This
should include supporting joint programs and
activities with the United States to bolster the
defense structures of the Caucasus and Central
Asian countries, including the establishment of
closer relations with NATO.
• Encourage U.S. partnership in and contributions
to the Black Sea region to foster security and
prosperity in the area.
• Be a willing and consistent partner in energy
matters and turn energy cooperation into a
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vital and long-term connection between the two
countries.
• Be a strong and steady voice in and for the
transatlantic community.
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CHAPTER 3
THE STATE OF U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS:
MOVING BEYOND GEOPOLITICS
Ian O. Lesser
As Ambassador Marc Grossman has observed, the
United States and Turkey are not natural allies. The
countries are divided by distance, culture, and the
natural differences in perspective between a global
and a regional power. For Americans, the relationship
has been sustained by broad-gauge geopolitical ideas,
above all the notion of Turkey as a “bridge” between
strategically significant regions, between the Muslim
world and the West, and between north and south.
In the Cold War context, Turkey was also seen as a
strategic “barrier” to Soviet expansion, a role that
some, especially in Europe, still see Ankara playing in
relation to risks from the Middle East and Eurasia.
Until quite recently, Turkish strategists have held
similar views about the importance of the United
States as a global partner in the containment of regional
adversaries, and as a backer of Ankara’s strategic
priorities, from European Union (EU) membership
to energy projects. Turks have long balanced a desire
for a seat at Washington’s strategic table with deepseated suspicion regarding U.S. intentions in Turkey’s
neighborhood (and toward Turkey itself). The Iraq war
has greatly reinforced Turkish suspicion, and has led to
a searching debate about U.S. power and its meaning
for Turkey. Most recently, Turkey’s political crisis—
the Islamism vs. secularism debate—has reinforced
Turkish sensitivities about U.S. preferences in Turkey.
This traditional and mutually reinforcing focus on
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geopolitics as the backbone of cooperation has led to
considerable volatility, frustration, and hollowness in
the bilateral relationship.
The Myth of a Golden Age.
The current strategic environment, with immediate
challenges in Iraq, Iran, and elsewhere in Turkey’s
neighborhood, places direct, practical demands on
U.S.-Turkish relations—tests rarely encountered in
past decades. It is too simple to contrast post-March
2003 frictions between Turkey and the United States
with a previous “golden age” of cooperation. In
reality, Turkish-U.S. relations since the 1960s have
been characterized by recurring tensions, including
widespread anti-Americanism, arms embargoes, and
disagreements over the Aegean, Kurds, northern Iraq,
and the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (Kurdish Workers
Party or PKK). Few, if any, of the contentious issues on
the bilateral agenda are truly new. Yet the relationship
has endured because of shared interest in larger
strategic “projects,” from the containment of Soviet
power to Turkey’s EU candidacy.
Changing Bilateral Dynamics.
What is new, and gives today’s troubled relations
special meaning, is the substantially changed foreign
and security policy outlook on both sides.
• On the Turkish side, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, and the social
movement it represents, has spurred changes
on the domestic scene. But it has also brought
a new look to Turkey’s foreign policy, with
more attention to the north, east, and south.
AKP strategists argue that this is simply useful
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diversification and a search for “strategic
depth.” Others in Turkey and Washington are
concerned that it suggests a more fundamental
shift in Turkey’s strategic orientation, fueled
by increasing ambivalence about Turkey’s
European project and irritation with the United
States. By design or by circumstance, more of
Turkey’s external policy energy is now devoted
to relations with Russia, Iran, Syria et al., and
rather less to the maintenance of relations with
Washington and Brussels. Does this add up to
a shift in national orientation? Probably not.
The weight of Turkish economic, political, and
security interests still lies with the West. The
Middle East is still seen more as an area of risk
than a place of opportunity. And relations with
Moscow still carry the burden of geopolitical
competition and centuries of suspicion. Closer
Turkish relations with Iran and Syria may
complicate the bilateral relationship with the
United States. But there may also be advantages
for U.S. policy. It is noteworthy that when EU
foreign policy chief Javier Solana held critical
talks with his Iranian counterpart on the nuclear
issue in April 2007, these talks were held in
Ankara.
• Populist politics, vigorous news media, and a
more diverse set of actors with international
interests mean that public opinion now counts
in Turkish foreign policymaking. Moreover,
the public and elite mood has turned decidedly
negative about the United States. This development, combined with the recurrent suspicion
held by Turkey’s foreign policy heavyweights—
and the atmosphere of strident nationalism in
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almost all sectors of society—has made Ankara
an increasingly difficult and sovereigntyconscious partner. Perceived rejection by Europe,
renewed PKK violence, and a pervasive sense
of national insecurity make nationalism the
common denominator in much of contemporary
Turkish politics. (Turkey is not alone here—a
resurgent nationalism is observable elsewhere
on the international scene.)
• On the U.S. side, the post-September 11, 2001
(9/11), focus on specific security challenges, with
less attention to long-term regional alliances, has
encouraged a tougher style in dealing with allies
like Turkey, and tougher criteria for measuring
cooperation. Key defense constituencies in the
United States remain disenchanted with Turkey
based on the March 2003 denial of a northern
invasion theater against Iraq (even if much
logistical support for the U.S. presence in Iraq
still goes through Incirlik Airbase). The Iraq war
has triggered a profound debate in Turkey, not
just about the specifics of U.S. policy, but about
the nature of U.S. power. More revolutionary,
“transformational” strategies in the Middle East
are a poor fit with Turkey’s conservative, status
quo approach to adjacent regions.
By contrast, Turkey’s strong economic performance
since the financial crisis of 2000-01 has spurred much
stronger U.S. private sector interest in Turkey. Recent
investments by Citibank (in Akbank) and GE Capital
(in Garanti Bank) are leading examples. Turkey has
led the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) in sustained growth over the
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last 5 years (6-7 percent per year), and the country
has attracted more foreign direct investment (FDI) in
the last 3 years than in the previous 80. Turkey now
counts some 24 dollar billionaires, only slightly fewer
than in Japan. The question, “Are we losing Turkey?”
is fashionable in Washington, but not on Wall Street.
Over time, this economic interest could produce a
strong new constituency for U.S.-Turkish relations—if
the current political instability does not lead to financial
instability.
Beyond Geopolitics.
A reinvigorated U.S.-Turkish relationship will
be less strictly bilateral, lower in expectations, less
geopolitically preoccupied, but more focused on
practical cooperation at the core. Some places to start:
• Put Turkey at the center of regional diplomacy
for Iraq. The debate in the United States has
focused on the role of Iran and Syria, but
Turkey is rarely mentioned. Ankara has at least
as much leverage over key aspects of the Iraq
scene, and a leading stake. It is imperative that
the United States convey a stronger interest in
Turkey’s concerns about the PKK and the future
of northern Iraq. Coordinated action against the
PKK should be at the top of the agenda. Turkey
and the United States share a core interest in
Iraqi stability. But if a more concerted approach
is not forthcoming, there is a risk that Turkey
will go it alone, as it has now shown strong
signs of doing, with negative consequences for
all sides. More emphasis should also be given
to the very important logistical role Turkey
has been playing in Iraq (perhaps 75 percent of
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materiel to support coalition operations in Iraq
goes through Turkish ports and airports)—a
reality that should weigh more heavily in
congressional attitudes toward Turkey.
• Focus on nuclear and missile proliferation
as a long-term policy planning priority with
Turkey. The emergence of one or more new
nuclear or nuclear-ready powers in the Middle
East will have a profound effect on the strategic
environment around Turkey. Turkey is unlikely
to “go nuclear,” but Ankara can be a key partner
in containing and managing Iranian ambitions.
NATO can be a useful voice to engage Turkey
on this issue (this might also be true on the issue
of the PKK and Iraq). Future U.S. and NATO
missile defense umbrellas should certainly
cover the most exposed members of the Alliance,
including Turkey.
• Foster a more diverse relationship. Turkish
and U.S. observers have long complained about
the shortcomings of a relationship too heavily
focused on security matters. The security
relationship is likely to remain unpredictable
in key respects, but the economic and other dimensions of the relationship, while expanding,
remain underdeveloped (precisely the opposite
of U.S.-India relations, for example). The
economic aspect is closely related to Turkey’s
continued convergence with European practice
in various sectors, whatever the prospects for
EU membership per se.
• Avoid the temptation to try to shape Turkish
internal politics. The current political crisis in
Turkey has resulted in close scrutiny there of
official U.S. attitudes toward democracy, civil-
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military relations, and the Islamism-secularism
debate. U.S. policy should certainly favor
democratic processes, but should also make
clear that these are Turkish dilemmas, to be
solved by Turks. U.S. leverage on the Turkish
internal scene is limited, and it would be easy to
“do harm” through an overly assertive approach
to Turkish internal affairs.
• Think about U.S.-Turkish relations in transatlantic terms. In key areas, from engagement
with Iran to attitudes toward the PalestinianIsraeli dispute, Turkish foreign policy is
essentially in the European mainstream. This
and other factors suggest that the prospects for
a revived U.S.-Turkish strategic relationship
depend critically on the restoration of
transatlantic relations as a whole. A troubled
transatlantic relationship will make a troubled
relationship between Washington and Ankara
much more difficult to fix, and will force Ankara
into a series of uncomfortable foreign policy
choices in the years ahead.

49

CHAPTER 4
TURKEY:
TILTING FROM U.S. TO EU?
Michael Lake
The simple approach to the Turkey-U.S.-European
Union (EU) relationship has been to assume that as
Turkey grows closer to the EU through the accession
process, the relationship with the United States would
assume less salience. This may well become the case
in the fullness of time. For now, however, this idea of
a tilt from the United States to the EU is too simplistic.
Even if it eventually becomes a member state of the
EU, Turkey will always continue to regard its relations
with the United States as a fundamental pillar of its
stability. Turkey historically feels threatened by
several of its neighbors, including Russia. Stability is its
number one priority and the number one responsibility
of any government—except perhaps for getting itself
reelected—so that Turkey will also want the best
possible relationship with the United States.
A return to normality in that relationship is of
the highest importance to the Turkish establishment,
something diplomats realize is difficult to get across
to the public during this time of malaise, if not crisis,
in Turkey’s relations with the EU, and the very bad
Turkish public opinion polls regarding the United
States. The big issues are general opposition to the
campaign in Iraq; a feeling that the United States is
doing little or nothing to curb the Partiya Karkeren
Kurdistan (Kurdish Workers Party or PKK) in northern
Iraq, which particularly agitates the Turkish military;
and a sense of incomprehension and dismay that their
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hitherto strategic ally could contemplate passing a
resolution in Congress which would effectively convict
the old Ottoman regime of genocide of the Armenians
in 1915, with the aim of punishing modern Turkey in
order to please a foreign (Armenian) diaspora which
has local votes in the United States.
The Turkish people have thus come to feel
somewhat alienated from the United States and, to a
lesser extent, from the EU. But the traditional elites
know that a return to normality in relations with the
United States is essential. A return to normality in
U.S.-Turkey relations is also in the interests of the EU,
which regards Turkey’s stability as a prime asset. All
relevant EU briefing papers refer to Turkey as an island
of stability in a turbulent region.
Turkey regards the EU as the second pillar of its
stability. Moreover, although the United States no
longer regards Turkey as a strategic partner (which
was its status throughout the Cold War and perhaps
until 2003), the EU does indeed regard Turkey precisely
as such a partner. Indeed, it has claimed Turkey as
a strategic partner of European countries for nearly
a century—for half of which time Turkey has been a
member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and a substantial European contributor of its
sizable land forces as well as other important military
assets. In particular, the EU regards the role Turkey
is playing in the broader Middle East as a stabilizing
one in the mutual interest. The EU appreciates the
role Turkey indirectly plays in the European Security
and Defence Policy (ESDP), its contributions of forces,
aid, and sometimes support for refugees in BosniaHerzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Lebanon, and the
Congo, and, until recently, civil leadership of NATO
forces in Afghanistan. EU ministers and commissioners
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tell the Turks that together they can help to dispel the
alleged clash of civilizations.
It is instructive to note that during the captivity of
15 British naval and marine personnel in Iran in MarchApril 2006 the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan telephoned the Iranian President Ahmedinejad seeking access for the Turkish ambassador in Tehran to visit the captives, and Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül spoke personally to Iranian Foreign Minister
Manuchehr Mottaki when they met at an international
conference.
How has Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership
affected its foreign policy? When Turkey was planning
to join the EU customs union in 1995, Turkish officials
pledged, in my presence, that if they got into the customs union they would closely follow the EU’s common foreign and security policy. This has happened.
This Turkish policy is also part of its accession (i.e.,
membership) program. Within this framework, the
EU regards Turkey as having achieved an advanced
level of alignment in external relations. In the United
Nations, for example, Turkey is in line with the EU on
92 percent of issues and formal EU declarations.
In return, has Turkey’s candidacy affected EU
foreign policy? It has certainly clarified the EU’s
strategic view of Turkey. Apart from its status and
qualities as a strategic partner, the EU sees Turkey
as a major economic and social partner in the region.
Turkey is now the seventh biggest trade partner of the
EU, and the EU accounts for between 50 and 60 percent
of Turkey’s trade. EU investment in Turkey is growing
by multiples of past annual percentage rates.
The EU takes very seriously two areas of interest in
which Turkey plays a pivotal role. One is the security
of the energy supply in an EU which includes Turkey,
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especially since Turkey would have on its borders the
most energy-rich regions on the planet. Turkey is in
the process of becoming a major energy hub providing
access to energy independent of Russia, which has
damaged its credibility as a reliable supplier.
The second area of interest is Turkey’s impact on
several transport modes, including its potential for new
and greatly improved corridors for road, rail, air, and
maritime pipeline connections between Europe and
its southern neighborhood. This infrastructure, which
would be heavily financed from EU “cohesion funds”
after Turkey’s accession to the EU, would facilitate the
economic and trade integration of the Mediterranean
region as a whole.
Probably the most dynamic factor influencing the
current EU view of Turkey—apart from controversy
created by those such as French leader Nicolas Sarkozy
who has stated flatly that he wants to keep Turkey out
of the EU—is the bigger and rather successful role it is
playing in the Middle East. It has good, uniquely longstanding working relations not only with Israel and
the Palestinians (both Prime Minister Ehud Olmert
and a Hamas delegation have visited Turkey), but also
with Saudi Arabia, whose King Abdullah paid a first
ever visit to Turkey in 2007, with Iran (Prime Minister
Tayyip Erdogan was there in 2007), and with Syria.
Turkey’s relations with Iran and Syria may not have
pleased the United States, nor did the visit of Hamas to
Turkey last year go down well, but it now seems that
Turkey was ahead of the game. It is not Turkey that
seems out of step.
President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt paid an official
visit to Ankara in early 2007 along with a huge
entourage, including four ministers. The leaders of
these two so-called “invisible rivals” consented to a
new “strategic dialogue” and signed a new agreement
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to improve bilateral relations between Egypt and
Turkey, including gas, trade, and investment projects,
with a special eye on an Arab gas pipeline expected
to be built through Turkey by 2009-10. In March, the
EU and Egypt adopted an EU-Egypt Action Plan
under the European Neighbourhood Policy, setting an
agenda for the next 3 to 5 years over a wide range of
sectors, based on Egypt’s own reform agenda in the
economic, social, and political spheres. The European
Neighbourhood Policy, a standing conditional offer
to all neighboring countries from Belarus to Morocco,
offers access to the EU’s vast internal market in return
for democratic and market reforms. Egypt is the eighth
country to sign up for an Action Plan. Others include
Ukraine, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority,
Tunisia, and Morocco. Turkey does not qualify for
the Neighborhood Policy because it is a candidate for
membership in the EU.
Turkey has always maintained correct relations with
Iran, and, setting aside the ebb and flow of migration
patterns, there are usually about two million Iranians
living in Turkey at any one time. Now Turkey and
Iran have agreed to establish a “strategic alliance” in
the energy sector, aiming at cooperation in drilling for
oil and natural gas, natural gas power plants, and the
transfer of Iranian oil and gas to Europe, which Europe
needs. The United States has expressed concern about
handing Iran such leverage.
The EU strongly backs Turkey’s efforts in the
Middle East, and has sought Turkey’s support in
persuading Syria to cooperate in resolving such issues
as the assassination of the Lebanese premier. The EU
has also sought Turkey’s good offices in convincing
Syria to follow policies that would facilitate Lebanon’s
participation in the European Neighbourhood Policy
with its substantial advantages. Similarly, the EU has
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enlisted Turkey’s help in persuading Iran to change its
position on neighboring extremists and nuclear issues.
Turkey fully supports the EU-3 efforts to turn back
Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions. Both the EU and
Turkey have now famously sat down with diplomats
from both Iran and Syria.
If the United States and the EU are the first and
second pillars of stability in Turkey, the region
surrounding it comprises the third pillar of most
concern. Turkey worries about the fragility of
authority in several of its important neighbors, not
least of which is Egypt. It is concerned above all with
Islamic fundamentalism. Those in Europe who worry
about Turkey should recognize that Turkey and its
inchoate Muslim government regard fundamentalism
and related terrorism not only as the great enemy of
Turkey, but the enemy of all—the United States, the
EU, and the Middle East.
How does the continuing Cyprus conflict affect
Turkey’s relations with the EU and within NATO? The
answer is, “Pretty bad.” Within the EU, Cyprus—that
is, the Greek Cypriots—has the veto power to block
the submission of any or all chapters of the acquis
communautaire (the body of EU law) to negotiation.
Although it has thus far refrained from doing so, it
has already vetoed any action of the EU to open the
ports and airports of northern Cyprus freely to EU
traffic. In response, Turkey has politicized the issue
of its contractual obligation to open its own ports and
airports to Cyprus, the unintended effect of which in
December 2006 was to block indefinitely eight chapters
related to the customs union out of the total of 35
chapters.
Now, however, negotiations seem to have resumed
on a more stable basis. The EU Council of Ministers
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has declared that the Cyprus issue should not be used
as a precedent for blocking other chapters. It reached
consensus in 2007 on so-called screening reports on
six chapters of the EU’s acquis, and two additional
chapters were opened for negotiation under the
German Presidency (an additional two were blocked
by France).
At the other extreme, if the Greek Cypriots play an
entirely negative game, they would try the patience of
the other 26 member states, representing 470 million
people, possibly beyond endurance. They could also
provoke Turkey into walking away, in which case
they would never get a settlement over land, houses,
compensation, or authority in northern Cyprus,
and thus lose the match. In the meantime Cyprus
wants to be included in the EU-NATO “Berlin Plus”
talks, to which Turkey objects on the ground that
the dossiers are confidential, a view backed up by a
December 2002 EU decision. Indeed, Turkey adheres
to a parallel December 2002 North Atlantic Council
decision excluding Cyprus and Malta from EU-NATO
strategic cooperation. Cyprus is a big reason, if not the
main reason, why there is no institutional relationship
between the EU and NATO. Cyprus wants to join both
NATO and the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) which gives Turkey a rare
spoiling lever—one cannot be surprised that Turkey
uses it.
The big issue, however, is Turkey’s EU membership,
and one day both the EU and Turkey will have to face
up to the huge stakes involved, and to the question
of whether Cyprus can continue to be allowed to
bedevil a hugely desirable strategic outcome. The
Cyprus question does not invite an easy answer. The
disagreeable fact is that some EU member states are
vaguely accused of hiding behind Cyprus in venting
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their own opposition to Turkey without making waves.
But some strong supporters of Turkey, such as Britain
and Spain, may yet call them to account.
The cost of the Cyprus problem to both sides is
wholly disproportionate to the larger goal. Cyprus
is in effect holding hostage the combined EU-Turkey
destiny involving 550 million people on the basis of its
insistence that Cyprus wins and Turkey loses. What has
successfully driven the EU forward thus far, however,
is a win-win dynamic for the EU vis-à-vis applicants.
Cyprus is challenging the entire historic EU ethos over
the issue of Turkey. Something eventually must give.
Some of the more difficult challenges facing Turkey are
likely never to be resolved until the Turks become more
confident that they will eventually enter the Union and
be compensated for their painful concessions. In terms of
the EU maintaining a realistic prospect of membership
for the Turks, the Cyprus issue casts permanent doubt.
A noteworthy and possibly sanguine development
is the pledge by the new Cyprus president, Demetris
Christofias, “to restart moribund talks to reunify the
island” and his expressed willingness “to meet the
leader of the breakaway Turkish Cypriots.”1
Nevertheless, we can expect continuing, robust
work on the accession program. The European Commission delegation in Ankara is now the biggest in the
world with 126 staff—larger than the traditionally
biggest delegation in Washington—and, apart from
monitoring the accession process, is managing more
than €500 million a year in pre-accession funds to
Turkey, which has also received €2 billion in loans
from the European Investment Bank. These are large
down payments by the EU on Turkish accession.
What steps could Turkey, the EU, and NATO take
to strengthen Turkey’s role in NATO and reduce
differences between Turkey and the EU? Turkey regards
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its own role in NATO as being of great importance. Its
role is secure and is a substantial asset to all partners. It
is the only area where Turkey can score against Cyprus.
The EU should be more careful about building up little
so-called “battle groups,” small groups of member
states for specialized issues from which Turkey feels
excluded.
Meanwhile, some more positive visibility of Turkey’s history as a loyal and effective NATO partner
would be useful. This history stands in stark contrast
with that of France, which de Gaulle withdrew from
NATO’s military structure back in the mid-1960s and
with that of Austria and Sweden, which both chose
the path of strategically unaligned neutral countries.
Turkey’s current role as an active, contributing strategic
partner of NATO and the EU should give the lie to the
view of some European politicians that Turkey has no
role in the EU.
The EU has approved a public information campaign aimed at the many elements of civic society
—news media, academics, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), think tanks, trade unions, professional
organizations, women’s organizations, and so on—to
foment widespread participation and dialogue between
Turkish and EU societies so as to familiarize each side
with the other. The European Commission will run the
program with a budget of around €70 million a year,
a lot of money in EU terms for a civic society project.
My own sensing is that the number of truly productive
conferences and seminars is rising.
What the United States can do to encourage Turkish
accession to the EU is less clear and requires a certain
finesse. The sad fact is that support from the Bush
administration is often unwelcome, especially in the
European Parliament, which now shares governance
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of the EU with the Council of Ministers. U.S. support
for contentious EU projects is more likely than not to be
counterproductive. Thus overt U.S. support for Turkish
membership in the EU, however well-intentioned
and justly based, is likely to make even more people
apprehensive about the Turkish matter.
The best role for the United States in this area,
therefore, is to help raise Turkey’s visibility and portray
it in a better light. In particular, it could highlight the
many areas where Turkey’s loyalty to NATO and
the West, to western rights and obligations, provides
continuing proven value. The United States could point
to those strategic areas where Turkish participation
is clear and helpful to an enduring common cause
across the Atlantic. The public should come to its own
more enlightened conclusions in the fullness of time,
especially given that we still have another 8-10 years
before an EU–Turkey Treaty of Accession lies on the
table. Some may think such public enlightenment to be
excessively optimistic, but it is possible if we concentrate
on getting the ball over the goal line of EU accession,
rather than allowing ourselves to be distracted by
scattered events on the periphery. Moreover, it will
happen not for the sake of the Turks, but because it is
in Europe’s best interests.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4
1. “Cyprus Elects Communist President,” Washington Post,
February 25, 2008, p. A9.
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CHAPTER 5
TURKEY AND NATO:
NEW IMAGES AND OLD QUESTIONS
W. Robert Pearson
Most people who follow the U.S. relationship with
Turkey and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) have focused on four widely shared
perspectives together forming the conventional
wisdom, if you will. These perspectives are, first,
that the relationship has been good for both Turkey
and NATO; second, that the U.S.-Turkey defense
relationship is critical to good relations between Turkey
and NATO; third, that for Turkey, NATO serves as a
substitute for the European Union (EU) while Turkey
awaits the outcome of its negotiations with the Union;
and fourth, that the EU would like Turkey’s soldiers
in case of trouble and Turkey’s economy in times of
peace, but it doesn’t want Turkey’s Turks, to put it
bluntly. There has been truth in all these assertions, but
the picture today is more complicated, and the events
to come are less foreseeable than at many other times.
Today, the conventional wisdom as noted above need
closer examination and more careful thought.
Turkey’s relationship with NATO has changed
constantly since 1952. Now, 55 years after Turkey was
admitted to NATO and on the 50th anniversary of
the EU, the question is how much energy remains in
the relationship. To a certain extent, NATO still binds
Turkey and Europe even without EU membership.
Turkish officers and military personnel participate as
equals in all of NATO’s widely distributed commands,
activities, and training facilities. NATO ensures that
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Turkey participates in military and security structures in
the Eurasian space with legitimacy. Article V, NATO’s
famously effective common defense clause, still
ecompasses Turkey should any serious external threat
arise, from Iran, for example. Turkey’s membership
in NATO also helps provide legitimacy for Europe’s
presences in central Asia, especially Afghanistan. The
fact that Turkey assumed the International Security
Assistance Force-NATO, Afghanistan (ISAF) regional
command mission in Kabul twice is an excellent
example of this link, as is the fact that Turkey also took
over command of the Multinational Task Force South
deployed in the southern region of Kosovo in May
2007. NATO also restrains Turkey’s options. Memories
of the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus in 1974
must be a factor in any Turkish military consideration
today about its options in northern Iraq vis-à-vis the
Kurds (though such memories did not prevent the
Turkish ground incursion in Northern Iraq in late
February 2008).
As Turkey’s domestic political scene evolves after
the dramatic election of July 22, 2007, and the tensions
between Turkey’s military commanders and the
elected government play out, NATO can be a highly
visible emblem of Turkey’s status and responsibility
and a channel for reminding Americans and Turks
together how critical it is in every circumstance to think
hard before acting and to appreciate how much more
valuable it is to work together. Here the United States
has clear responsibilities which will be discussed later
in the chapter.
For generations after the Korean War, Americans
spoke with great pride and gratitude of Turkish
sacrifices and victories in that conflict. This memory
came to personify for many Americans the entire
relationship. For Turks, Korea was important, but it
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never entered the Turkish consciousness the way it
did for Americans. In the context of the Cold War, two
American misconceptions arose from this experience
and played an important part in shaping TurkeyNATO and Turkey-U.S. relations for decades.
The first misconception was the over-weighted U.S.
focus on Turkey as a bulwark against the Soviets, to
the detriment of other goals. Aiding Turkey’s fledgling
democracy, strengthening democratic parties in
Turkey, seriously attempting to persuade Turkey to
stop its runaway inflation, all were secondary goals
compared to the need for Turkey’s strong political will
to face off against the Russians and to act as a forward
platform for U.S. weaponry and intelligence during
years of grave threat from the Soviets. The second
misconception, which every Turkish leader heard
again and again from 1952 on, was that Turkey was
a uniquely important piece of geostrategic real estate.
The lesson, in short, was that Turkey was important
just for being Turkey, and that the United States did
not ask more or need more from Turkey in the way of
support.
However, from the U.S. perspective, Turkey’s
cooperation and steadfastness during the Korean and
NATO experience did give rise to the belief that the
Americans could ask the Turks for help—and expect
it—without having to pay, promise, or commit too much
in return. On the positive side, the good will earned
by the Turks created a foundation of solid support in
the U.S. military, on the Hill, and among the American
people that persisted for decades. I am not recalling
these events to be critical of either country, but simply
to observe how the current of history, once established
in a deeply etched channel, continues in the prescribed
direction until other decisive events change its course.
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From the 1960s through the end of the Cold War,
there were a number of dramatic formative events.
There were military coups in Turkey in 1960, 1971, and
1980. In each case, the fabric of democracy in Turkey
was weakened, but the coups ultimately earned the
support of the Turkish people by restoring order to the
country. Moreover, the Turkish army, unlike so many
others around the globe, each time returned power to
the civilian leadership. In each case, its membership
in NATO allowed Turkey to maintain dialogue with
Europe and the United States and to preserve a form
of legitimacy.
As a result of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in
1974, NATO-Turkey relations plunged to perhaps
an all-time low. Turkey felt betrayed by allies, who
would not prevent the disaster threatening the Turkish
population on the island, and the allies knew after the
worst was over that the crisis would damage relations
with Turkey for years. The recovery of Turkey during
the years of Turgut Ozal (1983-93) also meant the
restoration of good relations with most of the NATO
allies, including the United States. During his 10 years
in power, first as prime minister and then as president,
Ozal reignited the Turkish economy and recouped the
former warm U.S.-Turkish relations.
In 1996, Turkey and Israel signed a major military
agreement. This opening has been severely strained at
times, but despite improving ties with Syria, Hamas,
and Iran, Turkey has never closed the door with Tel
Aviv and values its role as one possible mediator in
the Arab-Israel conflict. These events shaped, strained,
and modified the essential course of the NATO-Turkey
relationship, but they did not fundamentally shift it.
There can be no doubt that the existence of NATO,
even when not engaged directly, made it immeasurably
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easier to handle the difficulties and opened new
opportunities to move ahead.
Then came a great seismic event—the collapse of
the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War—for
which no one was really prepared. Neither was the
Turkey-U.S.-NATO relationship prepared for the end
of the Cold War. It was as if Turkey and NATO had
been waltzing through history without constraints
of time and space, when suddenly the band stopped
playing, the musicians packed up, and the lights were
turned off. Up until then, Turkey had been a favored
dance partner, but suddenly there were a lot of other
dancers from eastern and central Europe, some perhaps
even more attractive. Turkey must have wondered
in 1991 why it suddenly found itself standing on the
dance floor all alone without even an escort to the new
Europe. From that moment, Turkey and the United
States began moving on different tracks, even if no one
in the two countries saw it clearly at the time.
From 1991 on, Turkey’s traditional military and
defense industry allies in the United States continued to
think about Turkey in the old ways. In fact, the first Gulf
War, which effectively coincided with the final collapse
of the Soviet Union, seemed to strengthen the view that
Turkey was still the loyal ally, the staunch friend, and
an attractive market for defense companies. However,
the underlying structure was shifting. Though the proTurkey allies were still there, the external political and
strategic geography had changed.
Importantly, in Washington there was a failure
to grasp the danger flowing from the deep sense of
disappointment in Turkey that emerged when the first
Gulf War did not deliver on the promises made by the
Turkish and U.S. leadership that Turkey would greatly
benefit economically from the war. The Turks also
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hoped for an economic resurgence after the Cold War,
a peace dividend, just as did the populations of
every other NATO member. After all, the Turks had
shouldered one of the most important responsibilities
for NATO during the Cold War, facing off against
Moscow. But the Gulf War intervened. Instead of the
envisioned riches to flow from a new Iraq to Turkey,
Ankara saw lost opportunities and a failure by the
United States to make good on promised aid. The
United States pledged billions in aid to Turkey during
the first Gulf War, and none of this, or little of it, was
ever forthcoming. Rather than benefiting from that first
war, the Turks suffered the loss of key markets in the
lower Middle East and their traditional business
investment in the north of Iraq. In conversations in
the late 1990s, the Turks would describe their losses
as ranging variously from $35 billion to $150 billion.
In short, the Turks thought the United States reneged
on its pledges in the first Gulf War. The seeds sown
by this disappointment lay dormant for a decade and
then erupted into full bloom during the negotiations
in 2002 and 2003 over Turkey’s possible involvement
in operations against Iraq. In 2002, few Americans
recalled that the Turkish general staff had resigned in
the face of Ozal’s pledge to join the Americans in 1990,
and no U.S. official acknowledged to the Turks the
American failure to follow through with compensation
as promised in 1990. But no Turk ever forgot his or her
belief that the first Gulf War was generally injurious to
Turkey and to its economy.
Through the 1990s, there was still a body of support
in Congress for Turkey the democracy, but it seemed
more abstract now. The Cold War rationale which
had made the support second nature was no longer
there. Before the end of the Cold War, of all the NATO
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states Turkey’s democracy had penetrated the farthest
east, where it stood in splendid isolation. This sense
of singularity about Turkey now began to end. There
were many new states east of old NATO now seeking
membership. The states of the now-dead Warsaw
Pact and of the former Soviet Union surged to the
barricades demanding democratic governments and
membership tracks for admission to NATO. They and
the EU became the new darlings of political attention.
At the same time, the Turkish initiative to reach out
to embrace the states of central Asia did not achieve
its objectives. Upon achieving independence, the
Turkic-speaking states first wanted to identify with the
United States, Europe, and their institutions in order
to obtain Western political backing, investment, and
development funds. Still rebuilding its own economy,
Turkey was not able to either provide sufficient
influence with the West or muster the funds that the
central Asian states desired. There was also cultural
resistance. The Turks assumed they would be welcomed
as benevolent kinsmen, but the governments of central
Asia were not looking for a big brother. While the
initiative was moderately successful up to 1994 and
blunted some Iranian influence, it did not become part
of a new political or economic grouping as Ankara had
originally conceived.
The new post-Cold War security arrangements in
the greater Middle East did not come through NATO.
Victorious in the Cold War, the United States took
up the great power game, now free to use ad hoc
coalitions, backed by the United Nations (UN) and
NATO where possible, but no longer relying on the
veneer of external international legitimacy as much
as it did during the Cold War. Turkey still preferred
the security and certainty of international institutions
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and international legitimacy. As a diplomatically and
militarily cautious state in 1990, Turkey protected
itself militarily within secure borders in a dangerous
neighborhood and diplomatically on the international
stage through association with the consensus decisions
of its allies. American discussions in the early and mid1990s about the roles and responsibilities of a new
empire would have raised questions in the Turkish
mind about ultimate U.S. intentions concerning the
region.
As a result, when no-fly zones were set up in
northern and southern Iraq in 1991, the Turks and the
Americans had different objectives. This was not a
NATO arrangement, but a more loosely organized UN
structure, and the participating coalition was smaller.
Many in the United States saw these arrangements as a
permanent noose around Saddam Hussein’s throat and
even a measure that might precipitate his overthrow.
For their part, however, the Turks were happy for the
stability that Saddam’s authoritarian regime provided,
particularly an end to the refugee flow, and they were
largely content with his rule and its implicit certainty
that Iraq would not collapse or splinter into ethnic or
sectarian slices that could threaten its own stability
(read an autonomous Kurdish state).
The desire to stay within clear international authority resurfaced after September 11, 2001 (9/11). Turkey
was guided by the UN resolution immediately following the New York City and Pentagon attacks and
actually tried without success to use that resolution
to generate interest in a global definition of terrorism.
Concerning Afghanistan, the NATO decision invoking
Article V in favor of the United States gave Turkey
unimpeachable authority to say Yes to the U.S. request
for assistance in Afghanistan. In fact, in 2001 the
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Turkish government gave its formal consent within
an hour of the U.S. request for access to air space and
bases for operations in Afghanistan. Turkey’s secular
leadership in 2001 harbored great antipathy towards
the Taliban, seeing Kabul as a center of radical Islam
that could ultimately threaten the social and political
fabric of Turkey itself.
With continuing international legitimacy through
the UN and NATO, Turkey acted very positively in
Afghanistan, supplying forces and then a commander
for the coalition forces there on two occasions. Finally a
distinguished former Turkish foreign minister, Hikmet
Cetin, served as NATO’s senior civilian representative
in Afghanistan during the important early years.
By extension, Turkey answered a call from the UN
following last summer’s resolution and dispatched
a number of troops to Lebanon. Turkey thus has
demonstrated at regular intervals that it is clearly
prepared to play a responsible role in crises within
its region, including the participation of its military
forces. In that way, Ankara has acted both to promote
the role of key international peacekeeping institutions
in the area and to fill a leadership role when Turkey’s
interests justify such action.
By contrast—even sharp contrast—with respect
to the Iraq war, there was neither a UN nor a NATO
mandate that provided Turkey even a fig leaf for its
lack of equivalent authority under international law
to agree to the U.S. requests for support. Ironically,
the NATO decision on Afghanistan in October 2001
may have indeed been construed by some Turkish
decisionmakers thereafter as the only correct (and safe)
way for the country to proceed when deciding whether
to deploy troops outside its borders or help another
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country invade a neighboring state (hence Turkey’s
reluctance to become the theater for a U.S. invasion of
Iraq from the north).
Nor did the personal relationships forged at NATO
prove to be especially useful to the United States. Retired senior Turkish diplomats, newly minted as fledgling
politicians in Turkey’s opposition party following the
elections of November 2002, were in the forefront of
those opposed to the U.S. request. Their motivations
seemed to have been twofold. First, whatever the
short-term cost to U.S.-Turkey relations, they wanted
to damage the newly elected Justice and Development
Party (AKP). Second, these men reported that because
of their long diplomatic experience, they were the truly
expert negotiators with the United States and would
have secured a “better deal” for Turkey. Moreover, the
actual military-to-military negotiations for possible
cooperation between Turkey and the United States,
as well as misunderstandings that occurred during
the Iraq operation itself, left bruised feelings in both
militaries.
Today, NATO’s significance for Turkey continues
to evolve. NATO itself has shifted from being an allembracing alliance against a known threat to a forum
for multilateral decisionmaking on security questions
affecting the Eurasian land mass and, perhaps one day,
even the Middle East. NATO, along with the UN, is
a legal authority for the deployment of forces outside
Turkey’s borders, and only an overriding national
interest is likely to change that approach. There
are limits to Turkish commitment to international
decisionmaking, but the record reveals that those
exceptions are rare. Turkey continues to parley with
its European partners within NATO, for example, to
expand its opportunities to participate in EU military
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activities. NATO as a bulwark, both in its political
dimension and in its multilayered and complicated
military activities, still provides Turkey and the other
allies a forum for patient, professional dialogue on
sensitive issues.
However, NATO no longer serves as a status
substitute for the EU. The EU option can be pursued
only in Brussels. Turkey’s NATO membership is no
longer a cogent argument in Brussels for Turkey’s EU
aspirations. Especially since the elections of July 2007,
Turkey is likely to be judged on its pace of further
democratic progress. The Turks certainly do not see
NATO as a substitute for the EU benefits. Turkey long
ago realized that its future requires genuine economic
growth, and only the EU can provide a satisfactory
framework and discipline for these goals. So far as
political reform is concerned, NATO as an institution
historically did not generate momentum in Turkey on
such issues.
Where do these trends lead Turkey, the United
States, and NATO? First, Turkey will now pursue
increasingly separate approaches in its dealings
with NATO and the EU. While Turkey will remain
a vital member of the Alliance, as a result of the Iraq
War public support for NATO in Turkey may wane,
perhaps never regaining the levels of the Cold War.
Moreover, there has been for many years an ultranationalist (albeit minority) line of thinking in Turkey
that has argued against treaty obligations with the
United States or any other power on the grounds that
such ties weaken Turkey’s sovereignty. These views
surface periodically in calls, for example, for Ankara
to develop a balance of power approach and create
stronger ties with Iran, Russia, central Asia, or selected
Middle East states. These proposals may surface again
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over disappointment that NATO has done little to
help Turkey in its fight against the Partiya Karkeren
Kurdistan (Kurdish Workers Party or PKK) terrorism.
In addition, given the great unpopularity of the United
States in Turkey today, there is a risk that these calls
will be accorded greater credibility in public debate.
A second trend might emerge from events in the
former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan. As we saw
earlier, following the Cold War, Turkey’s importance
within NATO changed. Today, however, that change
provides a new opportunity for more Turkish activism,
one that had been obscured before. From 1991 onward,
Turkey’s value to the Alliance became more and more a
function of the political decisions it took with respect to
the region and the military decisions it took supporting
NATO’s out-of-area ventures. This occurred first in
Turkey’s decision to join actively in NATO efforts in
the former Yugoslavia, and, nearly a decade later, in
its decision to join the NATO effort in Afghanistan. If
Turkey continues this approach, the mutual importance
of NATO and Ankara for each other could grow.
There is scope for the Turkish leadership regionally
that would be very beneficial. The reelected AKP
government could even expand its opportunities for
dealing with a dubious Turkish military by politically
associating itself more openly with NATO and helping
to shape NATO’s evolving doctrine concerning outof-area operations. The future of the Black Sea region,
with its mix of new NATO members (Romania,
Bulgaria), key NATO partnership states (Ukraine,
Georgia), a resurgent Russia, and nearby neighbors
in conflict (Armenia, Azerbaijan), will present major
policy challenges for Turkey in the years ahead. With
a more active diplomacy and coordination within
NATO, Turkey might provide a pivotal influence on
both political and military issues.
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For the United States dealing with Turkey within
NATO, the Alliance framework also presents opportunities. The Supreme Allied Commanders Europe
(SACEUR) have always maintained a positive relationship with the Turkish military and will certainly
continue to seek out more occasions to keep Turkey
engaged. NATO can serve as a vehicle for a healing
process between the two militaries and for broader
dialogue on regional issues within a shared framework
of legitimacy as discussed just above. From the U.S.
political perspective at NATO, more active listening is
always a good thing.
While U.S. rhetoric praising Turkey has increased,
concrete action by the United States against the PKK
seems far too conditioned by the views of the Kurdish
leadership in northern Iraq. The current situation
harms both the United States and Turkey by allowing
tensions to fester between Ankara and Baghdad over
northern Iraq and by giving the PKK hope of driving
a wedge between Ankara and Washington. Moreover,
a Kurdish leadership in Iraq so in need of continued
U.S. help for the future of its region should recognize
its own interests in assisting Washington resolve the
PKK issue. It is certainly in the long-term interest of the
Kurds for the United States to have good relations with
Ankara. A policy that relies on Turkish forbearance in
the face of severe provocations leaves both timing and
choice concerning northern Iraq in Ankara’s frustrated
hands, as we have recently seen. Washington cannot
restore close ties with Turkey until the PKK issue is on
the road to resolution. In this circumstance, one has to
wonder why the United States permits this injurious
scenario to continue. Only the United States can compel
effective measures in Iraq. The puzzlement is that even
with anti-American sentiment at an historic high in
Turkey, Washington still procrastinates.
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If the United States were at last to take visible steps
to respond to Turkey’s concerns, there would be a
triple benefit. U.S.-Turkey relations would improve,
Turkey’s government would be able to begin to
improve NATO’s image domestically (which has
suffered in Turkish eyes for a failure to be responsive
to Turkey’s terrorism threat), and Turkey would
have greater maneuvering room to take the necessary
political, economic, and social measures to improve the
quality of life for its largely Kurdish population in the
country’s southeast. While NATO may not play a highprofile role, it can provide a setting for discussion of
these issues away from both Washington and Ankara
and thus play an indispensable part in achieving a
necessary reconciliation.
In sum, Turkey is in a new relationship with NATO,
and there are important opportunities for Ankara
and for the United States in the current environment.
There is an opportunity for Turkey and the United
States to better use NATO’s framework and avenues
of communication to improve relations between their
militaries and to help secure the political commitments
necessary to put U.S.-Turkey relations on a better
footing. U.S.-Turkey relations today are weaker than
at any time since the Cyprus crisis of 1974. NATO
can play a part in restoring those ties—the question is
whether the parties will recognize and take advantage
of the opportunities while there is time.
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CHAPTER 6
TURKEY’S NEW MIDDLE EAST ACTIVISM
F. Stephen Larrabee
The last decade has witnessed a remarkable burst
of Turkish activism in the Middle East. After decades
of passivity and indifference, Turkey is emerging as
an important diplomatic actor in that region. This new
activism and independence represent an important
departure in recent Turkish foreign policy. Except for
a brief period in the l950s, Turkish foreign policy has
been characterized by caution and aloofness from deep
involvement in Middle East affairs. For most of the
postwar period, the Middle East was largely off limits
for Turkish foreign policy.
However, this new activism in the Middle East
does not mean that Turkey is about to turn its back
on the West. Turkey is reintegrating into a region
of which it has historically been an important part.
The Republican period—with its strong rejection
of involvement in Middle Eastern affairs—was an
anomaly in Turkish history. For many centuries,
especially under the Ottomans, Turkey was an integral
part of the Middle East and the dominant power in the
region. Turkey’s current activism in the Middle East
represents a reversal of that anomaly and a return to
more traditional patterns of Turkish behavior.1
The Impact of the Gulf War.
The Gulf War was an important catalyst for
Turkey’s return to the Middle East. President Turgut
Özal’s support for the United States in the Gulf War
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represented a major break with Turkey’s previous
disposition toward noninvolvement in the Middle East.
Özal saw the war as an opportunity to demonstrate
Turkey’s continued strategic importance and cement
closer defense ties with the United States. Against
the advice of many of his advisors—and the Turkish
military—Özal threw Turkey’s full support behind the
U.S. military campaign to drive Iraq out of Kuwait.
Ankara cut off Iraq’s oil exports through Turkish
pipelines as part of United Nations (UN) sanctions
imposed on Iraq. It also deployed 100,000 troops along
the Turkish-Iraqi border and allowed the United States
to fly sorties against Iraq out of Turkish bases.
Özal hoped that his firm support for the U.S.
military campaign against Iraq would bring important
foreign policy dividends in terms of strengthening
the “strategic partnership” with the United States
and enhancing Turkey’s prospects for achieving
membership in the European Community (as the
European Union (EU) was then called). However,
Özal’s hopes proved illusory. The strategic partnership
with the United States remained a chimera while
Özal’s support of the United States did little to advance
Turkey’s membership in the European Community.
Economically, moreover, Turkey paid a high price for
its support of the U.S. military campaign in terms of
lost pipeline fees and trade.2
As a result of the Gulf War, Turkey found itself
drawn more deeply into the vortex of Middle East
politics. The war marked a major escalation of
Turkey’s Kurdish problem. The establishment of a de
facto Kurdish state in Northern Iraq under western
protection gave new impetus to Kurdish nationalism
and provided a logistical base for attacks on Turkish
territory by Kurdish separatists in the Partiya Karkeren
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Kurdistan Workers Party (Kurdish Workers Party or
PKK). While many Americans regard the Gulf War
as the heyday of U.S.-Turkish cooperation, for many
Turks, as Ian Lesser has noted, the Gulf War is “the
place where the trouble started.”3
Iraq and the Kurdish Challenge.
The U.S. invasion of Iraq has also been a major
catalyst for Turkey’s new focus on the Middle East.
Turkish policymakers had strong reservations about
the U.S. invasion from the outset. While they had no
love for Saddam Hussein, Turkish leaders saw him as
assuring stability on their southern border. They feared
that his removal would lead to the fragmentation of
Iraq, strengthen Kurdish aspirations for an independent
Kurdish state, and reinforce separatist pressures among
Turkey’s own Kurdish population.
Since then, Turkey has seen its worst fears realized.
Iraq remains politically fragile and has become a
breeding ground for international terrorism. Iran’s
influence has increased in Iraq and the region more
broadly. And the Kurdish drive for autonomy—as
well as eventual independence—has been given
greater impetus. Turkey is now confronted with a very
real prospect that an independent Kurdish state may
eventually emerge on its southern border. Turkish
officials fear that this could exacerbate separatist
pressures among Turkey’s own Kurdish population
and pose a threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity.
In the last several years, Turkey has witnessed an
upsurge of violence by Kurdish separatists led by the
PKK. The PKK has waged a highly destructive guerrilla
war in southeastern Turkey resulting in the death of
more than 35,000 Turks and Kurds since l984. After
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the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in l999, the
PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire. However, it took
up arms again in June 2004 and has launched repeated
attacks on Turkish territory from sanctuaries in the
Kandil Mountains in northern Iraq. These attacks have
resulted in the deaths of over 200 members of Turkish
security forces since January 2006.
The Erdogan government has repeatedly requested
U.S. military assistance to help eliminate PKK training
camps in northern Iraq. However, Washington has
been reluctant to take military action against the PKK
because it cannot spare the troops, which are needed to
combat the insurgency elsewhere in Iraq. In addition,
military action against the PKK could destabilize
northern Iraq, which is relatively calm compared to
the rest of Iraq. The Kurds have been the staunchest
backers of U.S. policy in Iraq. Without their support,
any hope for the emergence of a unified and stable Iraq
could collapse.
The reluctance of the United States to help Turkey
militarily to eliminate the terrorist threat posed by the
PKK has led to growing frustration and bitterness in
Ankara, which repeatedly threatened to take unilateral
action to eradicate the PKK threat and in late February
2008 did indeed launch a substantial week-long ground
incursion against PKK targets in northern Iraq. The
U.S. reluctance has contributed to a dangerous growth
of anti-American sentiment in Turkey. According
to a poll by the German Marshall Fund, among
European nations, Turkey reports the lowest approval
rating for President Bush’s handling of international
policies, with only 7 percent approving and 81 percent
disapproving. The strongest negative feelings toward
U.S. leadership were also found in Turkey, where
56 percent of respondents viewed U.S. leadership as
“undesirable.”4
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The status of the city of Kirkuk in northern Iraq
presents a second potentially explosive problem.
Kirkuk sits on top one of the world’s largest oil deposits.
Turkish officials fear that control of Kirkuk and its oil
wealth by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
would enable the Iraqi Kurds to finance an independent
Kurdish state. If the Iraqi Kurds attempt to make Kirkuk
the capital of their autonomous region, Turkey could
be provoked to launch a major ground invasion, which
could exacerbate instability in Iraq and the region as a
whole.
New Regional Activism.
Turkey’s greater activism in the Middle East has
also been reflected in its effort to strengthen ties to
its regional neighbors, particularly Iran and Syria.
Turkey’s relations with both countries were strained in
the l980s and l990s, in part because they supported the
PKK against Turkey. However, relations with Tehran
and Damascus have significantly improved in recent
years.
Concerns about the impact of rising Kurdish
nationalism have been a major driving force behind
Turkey’s rapprochement with both countries. Iran and
Syria have Kurdish minorities on their own territory.
They share Turkey’s interest in containing Kurdish
nationalism and preventing the emergence of an
independent Kurdish state on their own borders. This
has provided an important incentive for both countries
to cooperate more closely with Ankara.
Energy has also been a major driver behind the
warming of Turkey’s ties to Iran. Iran is the second
largest supplier of natural gas to Turkey after Russia.
In July l996 shortly after taking office, Turkish Prime
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Minister Necmettin Erbakan concluded a $23 billion
natural gas deal with Iran. The deal set the framework
for long-term delivery of natural gas for the following
25 years. Since then, energy ties have continued to
strengthen.
Relations with Syria have sharply improved in
the last decade. Like Turkey, Syria faces an internal
problem with its Kurdish minority, which has shown
increasing signs of restlessness. The Baathist leadership
around President Bashar Assad has been concerned
that the emergence of an economically robust Kurdish
government in northern Iraq could stimulate pressures
for economic and political improvements among
Syria’s Kurdish population and pose a challenge to
the regime’s stability. These concerns have been a
prime driver behind the growing cooperation between
Ankara and Damascus.
Ankara’s diplomatic engagement in the Lebanon
crisis in the summer and fall of 2006 provides another
example of Turkey’s new activism in the Middle East.
The Erdogan government’s decision to send 1,000
troops to participate in the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force in Lebanon represented an important departure from Turkey’s traditional policy of avoiding
deep involvement in Middle Eastern affairs and
provoked a heated internal debate in Turkey. Such an
action would have been unthinkable a few years ago,
thus underscoring Turkey’s readiness to play a much
more active role in the Middle East lately.
The Israeli Connection.
Turkey’s policy toward Israel has also undergone an
important shift. The Erdogan government has pursued
a much more active benign Palestinian policy than
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its predecessors. Erdogan has been openly critical of
Israeli actions in the West Bank and Gaza, calling them
acts of “state terror.”5 These remarks caused irritation
in Jerusalem and contributed to strains in Turkey’s
bilateral ties with Israel.
At the same time, Turkey has sought to establish
closer ties to the Palestinian leadership. A few weeks
after the elections in the Palestinian territories, Turkey
hosted a high-ranking Hamas delegation led by
Khaled Mashaal in Ankara. The visit was arranged
without consultation with the United States or Israel,
provoking strong anger in Washington and Jerusalem
because it directly undercut U.S. and Israeli efforts to
isolate Hamas until it met a series of specific conditions,
including acknowledgment of Israel’s right to exist.
Turkey’s approach to the crisis in Lebanon provides
another example where Turkey has adopted an
independent position at odds with Israeli policy. Erdogan sharply condemned the Israeli attacks, declaring
that they in no way could be considered legitimate.6
The attacks prompted large-scale protests and the
burning of the Israeli flag in several major Turkish
cities. A number of nongovernmental organizations
also issued statements condemning Israeli policies in
Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.
Implications for U.S. Policy.
U.S. policymakers will need to get used to dealing
with a more independent-minded and assertive
Turkey, one increasingly inclined to pursue its own
interests. This will particularly affect the ability of
the United States to use Turkish military facilities for
operations in the Middle East. Turkey is likely to be
extremely wary of allowing the United States to use
its military facilities for operations in the Middle East
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and Gulf except in cases where these operations clearly
serve NATO or Turkish national interests.
Relations with Iran and Syria represent another area
where adjustments are needed. Turkey has a strong
and enduring interest in maintaining good relations
with both countries. Pressuring Turkey to curtail these
ties or isolate either country will not work and will only
exacerbate strains in relations with Ankara. Rather
than seeing Turkey’s ties to Tehran and Damascus as
a problem, Washington should view them as an asset.
As a close neighbor with historical ties to the region,
Turkey can act as a useful interlocutor at a time when
U.S. ties to Iran and Syria are strained.
Finally—and most important—Washington needs
to address Turkish concerns about PKK terrorism
more resolutely. Washington should press the Kurdish
Regional Government in Northern Iraq to crack down
on PKK activities and close the PKK training camps
on its soil. Second, it should insist that the Kurdish
government in Northern Iraq arrest and turn over to
the Turkish government key PKK leaders, many of
whom continue to roam freely in northern Iraq and
even appear on Kurdish television stations supported
by the Kurdish autonomous government. Such a move
would have a dramatic psychological impact in Turkey
and do much to reduce the growing anti-Americanism
among the Turkish population.
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CHAPTER 7
THE NEW MIDDLE EAST, TURKEY,
AND THE SEARCH FOR REGIONAL STABILITY
Gökhan Çetinsaya
A new Middle East is emerging since the U.S.
invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The developments
in Iraq will have far-reaching consequences for the
region’s future. Iraq is like a miniature of the Middle
East with its population structure, social characteristics,
religious mixture, problems, and challenges. A process
of reciprocal influence is to be expected between
Iraq and its neighbors. Each domestic actor in Iraq
has relations with ethnic and religious groups in the
neighboring countries. The Kurds in northern Iraq
have links with the Kurds in Syria, Turkey, and Iran;
the Shiite Arabs have relations with Arab and non-Arab
Shiites in Iran, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia; the
Sunni Arabs have relations with the Sunni Arabs in
Syria and Jordan, and with Islamic movements in the
Arab world; and the Turcomans have relations with
Turkey. All the neighboring and regional countries also
have interest in and relations with these groups and
actors in Iraq. Therefore, the developments in Iraq will
affect neighboring countries, while policies pursued by
its neighbors will inevitably have an impact on Iraq.
The New Middle East.
The new Middle East seems to take its shape in the
light of the following interrelated trends:
• There is a rise of nonstate actors in the Middle
East. They appear (as witnessed in Iraq, Lebanon,
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and Palestine) to play crucial roles in the region.
They have their own armed militias; they fight
with the national armies; and they challenge the
states.
• There are at the same time ethnic and sectarian
groups. Both at the state and nonstate levels,
ethnic and sectarian groups are rising as new
influential actors, and ethnic and sectarian
discourse and politics will be dominant in the
region.
• There are also “Islamist” groups. “Islamism” or
“Political Islam” will be influential as a political
power. The “Islamist” trend includes both
armed and nonarmed groups, as well as both
Shiite and Sunni groups.
• A new strategic balance of power in the Middle
East is emerging. The results of the loss of
Iraq’s strong army and its “Arab identity”
in the region will be enormous. Iraq, as a
powerful Arab country, has withdrawn
from the regional equation, and Iran, Israel,
and Turkey will aim to fill the strategic
vacuum. The new Iraq, as a militarily weak
and politically unstable country, changes the
balance of power in the region especially at
the expense of the Arab world.
• In this new strategic environment, there has been
much discussion on the emergence of a “Shiite
crescent” in the region. In fact, there appears
to be emerging not one but three crescents in
the new Middle East:
			 1. The Shiite crescent. The new Iraq turns
out to be a country in which the Shiite Arabs
may dominate both the central government
and foreign policy in the federal and democra-
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tic processes as prescribed by the constitution.
It is inevitable that in such a situation Iran will
gain an enormous advantage. The economic,
social, cultural, and religious interactions
between the two countries that had been
stymied by the Ba’ath regime will definitely
increase in this new era. These interactions
will cause anxiety for other regional actors,
who think that a “Shiite crescent” is being
created in the region stretching from Pakistan
to Lebanon. Shiites comprise 60 percent of the
population in Bahrain, 40 percent in Kuwait,
14 percent in Saudi Arabia, and 35 percent
in Lebanon. In some analyses, the Zaydis
who comprise 73 percent of the population
in Yemen and the Nusayris in Syria, who
remain outside the Twelver Shiite Islam, are
also added to the crescent. This politicalreligious crescent is at the same time an “oil
crescent” under Shiite control, stretching
across Iran, Bahrain, the eastern province of
Saudi Arabia, and southern Iraq. In addition
to the aforementioned geopolitical-economicreligious factors, one should also expect the
effects of social and cultural changes from the
process of globalization in the Shiite world.
			 2. The Muslim Brotherhood crescent. The
new Middle East has witnessed the rise of the
Muslim Brotherhood parties in different parts
of the region. The parties which adopted the
political, social, and religious philosophy
of the Muslim Brotherhood movement are
gaining strength in Sunni Arab politics day
by day. In countries like Palestine, where
democratic elections were allowed, these
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parties won the elections. In other countries
like Egypt and Jordan, where democratic
elections were not allowed, they became main
opposition parties.
			 3. The Kurdish crescent. The developments
in northern Iraq will inevitably have political,
social, economic, and cultural impacts on the
Kurds living in Turkey, Iran, and Syria, all
neighboring countries. Both in the short and
the long run, these countries will feel the impact
of the “Kurdish Federal Region,” which was
established in northern Iraq. The rise of the idea
of independence and a pan-Kurdish movement
should be expected to gather momentum,
especially among the post-1991 generations in
northern Iraq. In addition to mutual political
effects, we should also expect social, cultural,
and economic interplay due to strong tribal and
religious relations across the borders. Cultural
interaction will have wider dimensions given
the opportunities of globalization, i.e., news
media, universities, newspapers, magazines,
other literary products, and internet facilities.
A significant economic interaction should also
be expected in this crescent, especially between
Turkey and northern Iraq.
Turkey and the New Middle East.
In this new Middle East, Turkey faces several
challenges, risks, and opportunities. Turkey is extremely anxious over the regional ferment discussed
above, and tries to pursue a careful and comprehensive
diplomacy in the region in order to forestall consequent
adverse developments. Turkish political and military
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elites believe that the disintegration of Iraq and/or
new destabilizations in the Middle East could be
disastrous for the region as well as Turkey.
What is Turkey’s current policy toward the
Middle East? Turkey’s position can be understood
only in the context of the general foreign policy and
strategic vision of the new Turkish foreign policy
decisionmakers or the Justice and Development Party
(JDP) elites. In their vision, Turkey has become a
pivotal country and a regional power in Eurasia and
the Middle East since the end of the Cold War, with
great potential for playing a constructive role and
also even the potential to become a global actor. This
vision, which denies a mere “bridge” role for Turkey,
sets forth four main principles of Turkish foreign
policy. The first principle is to establish a link between
freedom and security. After September 11, 2001 (9/11),
the world led by the United States became urgently
preoccupied with security, largely at the expense of
freedom. The only exception in this context has been
Turkey: Only Turkey after 9/11 achieved freedom and
democratization at the same time; only Turkey adopted
a further democratization program without risking its
security, both in internal and external politics.
The second principle might be called “zero-problems
with the neighbors.” According to this injunction,
rather than viewing neighboring countries as enemies
or potential enemies, or adopting a defensive attitude
towards neighbors, Turkey should aim to establish good
relations with all of its neighbors. By implementing
this principle, Turkey will gain extraordinary room for
maneuver in the region. Such an orientation is also the
first prerequisite for Turkey to become a pivotal state
or a key player in the Middle East.
The third principle is to establish a multidimensional and multitrack foreign policy, which also entails
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Turkey’s assumption of a new pivotal role in the
Greater Middle East region. In today’s international
and regional dynamics, Turkey cannot maintain a static
or one-dimensional foreign policy, but instead should
pursue multiple tracks. Accordingly, for example, it is
not a contradiction to create joint ventures with both
Russia and the United States, or both the United States
and the European Union (EU). It is not a contradiction to
establish close relations with its neighbors and maintain
strategic relations with the United States. Turkey can
discuss the problems and create solutions in the East,
without denying its western identity. At the same
time, Turkey can adopt western values and principles
and can discuss the future of Europe from a European
perspective, without denying its Eastern identity. In
this way, Turkey can also contribute to the EU’s bid to
become a global power, instead of a continental power.
This vision sees all these joint or multidimensional
relations as different parts of a unified Big Picture,
much like viewing the global system as a giant jigsaw
puzzle in which Turkey seeks its proper position vis-àvis the positions of its neighbors, friends, and allies.
The final principle is to pursue a proactive and
visionary foreign policy, instead of a passive, reactive,
or defensive foreign policy. Turkey, as a regional
power and a pivotal country, should formulate and
pursue a proactive, constructive, and comprehensive
foreign policy that does not shrink from taking prudent
initiatives. In the new international and regional
environment, Turkey should not become a source of
problems, but a problem-solving country, and should
take initiatives to solve the problems of its region.

90

Turkish-American Interests in the Middle East.
The “Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to
Advance the Turkish-American Strategic Partnership”
document, dated July 5, 2006, posits that Turkey and the
United States “share the same set of values and ideals
in our regional and global objectives: the promotion of
peace, democracy, freedom, and prosperity.” Turkey
and the United States pledge themselves to work
together on all issues of common concern, including,
•

promoting peace and stability in the broader
Middle East through democracy;
•	  supporting international efforts towards a permanent settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict,
including international efforts to resolve the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the basis of a twostate solution;
• fostering stability, democracy, and prosperity
in a unified Iraq;
• supporting diplomatic efforts regarding Iran’s
nuclear program, including the recent P5+1
initiative;
• contributing to stability, democracy, and prosperity in the Black Sea region, the Caucasus,
Central Asia, and Afghanistan;
• supporting the achievement of a just, lasting,
comprehensive, and mutually acceptable settlement of the Cyprus question under the
auspices of the UN, and in this context ending
the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots;
• enhancing energy security through diversification of routes and sources, including from the
Caspian basin;

91

•
•
•
•
•
•

strengthening transatlantic relations and the
transformation of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO);
countering terrorism, including the fight against
the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (Kurdish
Workers Party or PKK) and its affiliates;
preventing proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD);
combating illegal trafficking of persons, drugs,
and weapons;
increasing understanding, respect, and tolerance
between and among religions and cultures;
and
promoting effective multilateral action to find
solutions to international challenges and crises
of common concern.

Looking at this lengthy list, we perceive that the majority
of U.S. and Turkish interests seem to be converging.
But there are differences in perspectives concerning
the realization of these interests. In other words, the
aims are identical, but the means are conflicting.
The case of the Broader Middle East and North
Africa Initiative (BMEI) is illuminating. In principle,
the ruling JDP elites support the U.S. BMEI project as
an essential initiative for the future good of the Middle
East. This vision accepts globalization as a natural
stage of world history, and it is not surprising to see
the effects of globalization in the Middle East already
occurring. Globalization will thus manifest itself fully
in the Middle East sooner or later, regardless of the U.S.
initiative. The transformation towards democratization
in the Middle East is less secure. It should have
begun 10 years ago at the end of the Cold War, as in
Eastern European countries. It did not happen then
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for several reasons, but it should certainly start now.
The Middle East cannot survive for very long with its
present political systems, and should therefore adopt
democratic values and structures, and integrate itself
into the global system. But the JDP elites find reason to
criticize the method or style of implementation of the
initiative by the Bush administration.
For Turkish elites, there are two main stipulations
with regard to implementation of the American
initiative. First, the initiative should not change the
political landscape of the Middle East. It should not
fragment or dissolve existing nation-states or alter their
current borders. This would lead to chaos in the region.
Second, the implementation should emerge from within
the existing framework of each national system and
people, and should take social, cultural, and economic
parameters of each regional member into account.
This new Turkish foreign policy vision argues that a
self-confident Turkey should formulate and develop
its own project in terms of the BMEI, and implement
it within its own parameters. Then, according to this
vision, Turkey could manage great transformations in
the region without foreign intervention. In this regard,
Turkey should have an active policy for the future of
the region, prepare the conceptual framework for this
initiative, share it with the people of the region, and
transform the region even as it maintains peace and
stability.
The Turkish elites also have reservations with
respect to U.S. intentions vis-à-vis Iran. Like the United
States, Turkey is against the nuclearization of Iran.
A nuclear Iran would change the strategic balance
between the two countries and in the region at the
expense of Turkey’s national security interests. But
Turkish political and military elites are also against
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U.S. military intervention in Iran. First, Turkey does not
want another war and another round of destabilization
along its borders in the mold of developments in Iraq
since 2003. Second, such intervention could entail
great economic costs for Turkey, as well as direct
military threats to its security. Turkish elites argue that
a foreign military intervention in Iran would lead to
destabilization and disintegration of Iran, and that this
would strengthen Kurdish nationalism or facilitate the
establishment of an independent Kurdish state. Ankara
and Tehran collaborated on the Kurdish issue from
the 1930s until the mid-1960s, and now they are in full
collaboration on the issue of PKK terrorism. In other
words, Turkey sees the possibility of a nuclear Iran as
a long-term threat; however, the most salient shortterm threat in the eyes of Turkish political and military
elites is PKK terrorism, along with the possibility of
a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. On all these shorterterm issues, Turkey needs the help or support of Iran.
As if all the foregoing Turkish concerns were not
enough, it appears that in recent months a new division
has emerged in the Middle East between the so-called
radicals (the anti-American actors Iran, Syria, Hamas,
Hezbollah) and the so-called moderates (pro-American
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait). The two sides
struggle for power over Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine,
and both sides fight proxy wars. In this new picture, all
groups look to Turkey, and all groups want Turkey in
their camp. But Turkey is extremely anxious over these
developments in the region. What does Turkey want?
Turkey does not want confrontation or a new cold war
in the Middle East between the Shiites and Sunnis, or
pro-Americans and anti-Americans. Turkey wants an
engaging dialogue, security-building measures, peace,
stability, cooperation, and integration. Turkey wants
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to play a constructive, facilitating, and balancing
role in the new Middle East. Turkey wants to
establish balanced and equal relations with all actors
on all levels. Turkey argues that relations based on
confrontation should be abandoned. Instead, an
active, constructive, and multidimensional policy
which emphasizes peace, security, democracy, and
stability should be developed. To this effect, Turkey
is ready to pursue a comprehensive public policy
towards the people and actors of the region and
international actors. Among Turkey’s expectations
are participatory democracy based on territorial
integrity; effective use and fair sharing of resources;
ethnic-sectarian integration; pluralism; security for
all; constitutions that guarantee basic rights and
freedoms; political consensus; and stability. From
Turkey’s point of view, the new Middle East needs
four fundamental features for peace and stability: (1)
a regional security system for all; (2) mutual political
dialogue; (3) economic integration and interdependence;
and (4) cultural pluralism.
A Proposal for Regional Peace and Stability.
The problems in the Middle East are highly complex, interrelated, and intertwined. Negotiation or dialogue between two actors cannot solve regional problems. Therefore, a comprehensive and all-inclusive
mechanism is needed to enhance prospects for peace
and stability in the Middle East. All regional and
global actors (all regional countries plus the UN,
UN Security Council, G-8 countries, Organization of
Islamic Countries, Gulf Cooperation Council, and the
Arab League) should be involved; and all regional
problems should be dealt with on the same table at the
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same time. For this purpose, a new “Helsinki Process”
for the Middle East, adapted according to the realities
and nature of the region, should be established.
Through this mechanism, a process of confidencebuilding measures, encouragement of political
dialogue, economic integration and interdependence,
and cultural pluralism in the region might well be
achieved.
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CHAPTER 8
THE EVOLVING EU, NATO, AND TURKEY
RELATIONSHIP
Sinan Ülgen
Turkey’s quest to take part fully in transatlantic
as well as European security structures remains unresolved due to Cyprus, a problem that undermines the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-European Union (EU) relationship with serious ramifications
for transatlantic dialogue on strategic security. The
Cyprus matter also precludes Turkey’s further
convergence with the European Security and Defense
Policy (ESDP) and creates a genuine dilemma for Turkish
policymakers. While NATO remains a fundamental
foreign policy pillar for Turkey—and Turkish and
U.S. positions on the future of NATO converge—the
Alliance remains handicapped by political difficulties
that could be partially overcome if Cyprus is resolved.
But incentives are lacking for a long-term settlement, a
situation that highlights the need for an improvement
in the Turkey-U.S. relationship.
Turkey’s EU membership process has affected
Turkish foreign and security policy, its perception of
NATO, and its relationship with the United States in
many different ways. The starting point for Turkey
can be characterized as the quest to maintain NATO’s
role as the primary institution for security and defense
in Europe and as the main forum for transatlantic
cooperation, while carving out a role for itself within the
burgeoning sphere of European security and defense.
Turkey achieved a considerable degree of success a
decade ago by obtaining virtual member status within
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the Western European Union (WEU). This achievement
proved, however, to be of a temporary nature. The
St. Malo agreement of 1998 between the United
Kingdom (UK) and France, which paved the way for
the development of a ESDP within the EU structures,
meant the dissolution of the WEU as the security arm
of the EU. It also meant the sudden disappearance of
all the hard-fought acquis (attainments) that provided
the foundation of the security relationship between
Turkey and the EU.
Since then, the security relationship between
Turkey and the EU has had to be redefined. This
exercise proved to be a difficult and strenuous one,
and the process has been significantly influenced by
the internal political dynamics within an EU intent
on determining the limits of the communautairization
(“communitization”) of defense and security policy.
The concomitant process of enlargement, and the
constitutional debacle which ushered in a new period
of reflection on the future of Europe, further muddled
the picture. Finally, the lingering uncertainty about
Turkish accession provided another layer of volatility.
Indeed, policymakers have had to negotiate the
current institutional arrangements between Turkey
and the EU member states in the field of security and
defense cooperation without knowing whether they
were temporary or permanent. Had there been a clear
political will on the EU side for supporting Turkey’s
full membership objective, Turkish policymakers may
have been more flexible with regard to their demands,
knowing that these arrangements would necessarily
be upgraded once Turkey became a full member.
As things stand, the Turkey-EU relationship in
the security domain is still fraught with difficulty.
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Turkey’s aspirations to become a full-fledged contributor to Europe’s security, with rights nearly equal
to those of EU full members, remain unfulfilled. In
particular, Turkey wants to be fully associated with
the planning and implementation of EU-led missions,
as opposed to being asked for its contribution if and
when needed and after the political and technical
planning phase is completed. Such full association is
how Turkish policymakers define the characteristics of
a genuine partnership in this sphere. They also believe
that if these conditions were to hold, Turkey could
substantially reinforce the EU’s military and civilian
crisis management capacities. Furthermore, the last
EU enlargement, which brought in the Republic of
Cyprus, creates a new set of problems, not only for the
Turkey-EU relationship, but also for the EU-NATO
relationship.
The central problem for the EU-NATO relationship
can be traced back to the interpretation of the agreement
between NATO and the EU, reached at the end of 2002.
It basically sealed the decision made by NATO at the
Washington Summit to provide support to the EU
under “Berlin Plus” in exchange for certain rights within
the ESDP for non-EU European allies, as stipulated in
the Nice implementation document. Non-Partnership
for Peace (PfP) countries and those lacking a security
agreement are excluded by the NATO decision from
activities, including discussions, related to both Berlin
Plus and strategic partnership. The EU decision,
however, limits the exclusion only to Berlin Plus and
does not refer to strategic cooperation. Therefore, under
the NATO decision, Cyprus is excluded (along with
Malta) from participating in any activity falling under
“strategic cooperation.” This is not the case, however,
according to the EU decision. Today, the EU seeks to
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overcome the problems posed by this wording. On the
basis of the EU solidarity principle, the EU claims that
Cyprus can no longer be left outside the scope of this
arrangement and refuses to engage in dialogue with
NATO without all EU members sitting around the
table.
As a result, while there is an agreed mechanism
to do so, there is practically no meaningful dialogue
between NATO and the EU on emerging threats. EUNATO strategic cooperation remains blocked. The
agenda of the regularly scheduled joint meetings of
the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the EU Political
and Security Committee (PSC) are generally void of
any new items and can legitimately discuss only the
Berlin Plus operation in Bosnia. Questions of imminent
concern, such as the fight against terrorism and energy
security, cannot be tackled.
This state of affairs can also negatively impact
performance in the theater of operations. The need
for strategic cooperation will become more pressing
as the EU prepares to replace the UN in Kosovo and
undertakes a rule of law mission in Afghanistan.
In both of these areas, NATO’s military presence
will coexist with EU civilian missions. The existing
collaboration in the field between the two institutions
cannot remedy the lack of cooperative interaction at
the policy level in the headquarters. This predicament
will be increasingly visible if and when the situation
on the ground, especially in Afghanistan or Kosovo,
becomes crisis prone. In short, the uncertainties linked
to Turkey’s EU accession and the intractable problem
of Cyprus have created serious detriments to a genuine
and substantive NATO-EU partnership.
The inability or unwillingness of some EU member
states to think constructively about the institutional
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arrangements linking Turkey to the ESDP creates a
dilemma for Turkish policymakers. On the one hand,
on almost all issues related to regional security (with
the notable exception of the Cyprus problem), Turkish
policy is actually quite closely aligned with European
foreign policy. It is perhaps worth recalling that Turkey’s alignment with Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) statements and common positions stands
at 92 percent.
Turkey has participated in a number of military and
civilian ESDP missions including those in Macedonia
(two) and the Congo. It is currently participating
in missions in Bosnia (two) and Kinshasa. Turkey
is also slated to participate in the EU-led Kosovo
police mission as well. Indeed, it is the most active
participant in ESDP missions among all third countries
and outperforms many EU member states as well. It is
the sixth largest contributor to the Althea mission in
Bosnia, for instance. In addition, Turkey makes regular
commitments to the EU’s headline goals by specifying
the different military assets to be incorporated in the
catalogue of EU forces. Turkey is also set to become
a contributor to the Italian-led EU battlegroup to be
established in the second half of 2010.
Furthermore, Turkish security doctrine is more at
ease with the approach outlined in the EU security
strategy than with U.S. security strategy. References
to effective multilateralism, soft power, and critical
dialogue contrast with the more robust and direct
approach of the United States to regional security,
as illustrated particularly in Iraq and as feared in
some quarters in relation to Iran. With its growing
political and economic influence and self-confidence,
Turkey has become more active in regional politics. Its
relationship with the countries of the Middle East has
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improved considerably. Trade and investment flows
between Turkey and the region are at an all-time high.
Therefore, there would be significant opportunity
costs for Turkey of a radical change in the status quo
in the region. In that sense, Turkey is a regional status
quo power. Whereas the EU is perceived as a more
conservative foreign policy actor, the United States is
seen as an impatiently proactive power that sometimes
acts without giving measured consideration to where
all the chips may fall. It may be useful to recall that
one of the main stumbling blocks during the TurkeyU.S. negotiations in February 2003 before the ill-fated
vote of the Turkish parliament on the opening of a
new northern front in Iraq, was the inability of the U.S.
administration to spell out convincingly to Turkish
authorities what the U.S. exit strategy for Iraq was.
The dilemma for Turkish authorities is therefore a very
fundamental one. From a policy perspective, the natural
ally seems increasingly to be the EU. But institutional
and political realities preclude the elaboration of a
mutually satisfactory framework for the deepening of
the Turkey-EU security cooperation.
On the foreign policy front, the Turkey-EU
relationship has not progressed as one would have
hoped. The reason is the difficulties brought about by
the start of the accession negotiations. Whereas the
initiation of negotiations had been expected to usher
in a period of increased mutual trust, confidence, and
therefore collaboration, the real as well as imaginary
barriers erected in Europe against Turkey’s full
membership have prevented such an outcome. As a result, foreign policy cooperation and dialogue between
Turkey and the EU remains below its potential. The
frequency, scope, and format of the currently existing
framework for the exchange of views on regional
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issues such as Iran, Iraq, and the Caucasus, and even in
the area of energy security, are clearly insufficient for
a genuine policy dialogue and partnership to emerge
between Turkey and the EU.
Given this state of affairs, Turkey’s outlook on
NATO and on evolving U.S.-Turkey relations acquires
more importance. As regards NATO, Turkey has
traditionally been a very Atlanticist nation. The sharing
of a long border with the former enemy was surely a
factor in this regard. Now that the Cold War is over,
NATO’s importance for Turkey remains undiminished:
NATO is the essential security organization for Turkey.
Furthermore Turkey’s absence from the EU’s security
structures serves to underscore NATO’s uniqueness.
Moreover, NATO’s agenda is pretty much aligned
with the priorities of Turkish foreign policy. Almost all
issues taken up by the North Atlantic Council relate to
areas of direct concern to Turkey. In other words, there
is a definite convergence between NATO’s policies
and Turkish foreign policy. Given that the NATO map
of threat assessments focuses on regions in Turkey’s
neighborhood, this symmetry is likely to be sustained
in the longer term as well. One might therefore claim
that Turkey finds NATO working on its top “hard
security” priorities whereas the EU appears to focus
on a more comprehensive agenda involving “soft
security.”
Turkey formulates its policy regarding the future of
NATO against this backdrop. The Turkish position is
very similar to the U.S. position as regards the future of
the Alliance. Turkey believes that NATO is essentially
a political and military organization and that, as such,
its role is not limited to purely military matters. In
other words, NATO should be a platform for Alliance
members to discuss global and regional political
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developments that have a bearing on the security of
NATO members. Turkey also believes that in addition
to hard security, NATO could potentially play a role
in providing soft security in crisis areas by enhancing
its civilian crisis management capabilities. This is,
however, a contentious issue between the United
States and some European members of the Alliance,
who are resisting all efforts to steer the Alliance
towards these objectives. For those countries, NATO is
a purely military organization with no role to play in
furthering political dialogue on regional issues. By the
same token, civilian crisis management falls under the
responsibility of the EU. Hence a clear division of tasks
between the EU and NATO is to be followed, in which
the EU should be the primary organization for civilian
crisis management.
Ironically, even though Turkey shares the U.S.
view on the future of NATO, the obstruction of NATOEU strategic cooperation due to the Cyprus problem
plays in favor of those countries that have a less
ambitious vision for the future of the Alliance and a
preference for the EU to build up its own civilian crisis
management capabilities. In other words, because the
two institutions cannot officially discuss the strategy
for new ventures, NATO remains stuck in its present
ambit. The institutional bottleneck caused by the
question of Cyprus also serves to conceal the deep rift
between the United States and some of the European
members of NATO on NATO’s role and future. As a
consequence, if these divisions are not remedied, the
fear is that the United States will cease to view NATO
as a useful organization. The outcome would then be
the weakening of the transatlantic link in the security
domain and a more definite shift of U.S. policy towards
unilateralism or at best bilateralism.
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Turkey is therefore under increased pressure
from its European allies to accept the new state of
affairs and lift its veto on Cyprus. So far, Turkey has
conditionally decided to lift its objection to the NATOEU strategic dialogue with the EU-27, i.e., including
Cyprus. The conditions require that the meetings be
held nonofficially (i.e., “informal” dialogues) and only
in relation to urgent matters involving humanitarian
concerns. As a result of this relaxation of attitude,
informal NAC-PSC meetings were held on Darfur and
on Kosovo.
Turkish officials are undoubtedly aware of the
detrimental consequences for the Alliance as a whole
of their blocking the conclusion of Cyprus’ security
agreement with NATO. Technically, it is the absence of
such an agreement which prevents Cyprus from taking
part in the EU-NATO strategic dialogue. The other
condition is Cyprus’ participation in PfP. However,
this is a strategically and politically sensitive decision
for Turkey. It is seen as the sole real leverage that
Turkey has on the Papadopoulos regime in Greece. It
must be recalled that Cyprus (and Greece) are blocking
Turkey’s security agreement and its participation in
the European Defense Agency (EDA), even though
Norway, another non-EU NATO member, is allowed
to participate fully in EDA. The Cypriot government
is intent on using Turkey’s negotiations process to
steal concessions from Turkey regarding a political
settlement on the island. For Turkish policymakers,
the NATO card remains an indispensable element in
their efforts to redress this asymmetric relationship.
The international community has so far been
unable to induce the Papadopoulos government to
continue the UN-sponsored negotiations on Cyprus
in good faith. The incentives for the Greek Cypriots
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to adopt a conciliatory stance are lacking. They are
comforted by their internationally recognized status,
and their EU membership gives them additional
confidence. So unless a serious commitment is made
by the international community to support the UN
process and create the right incentives for the Greek
Cypriots to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement
with the Turkish Cypriots, Turkey will most likely
continue to block any initiative for Cyprus to conclude
a security agreement with NATO. As a matter of fact,
this is perhaps not more than an annoyance for the
Greek Cypriots. The Greek Cypriot government may
eventually be unwilling or find it politically impossible
to apply for NATO partnership. But, at the least,
the present state of affairs serves to underscore the
existence of an international problem and raises the
specter of possible contagion in other areas. Therefore,
it may induce the transatlantic community to become
more actively involved in the resolution of this specific
conflict.
The United States will be a key player in this effort.
Yet, U.S. policy on Cyprus will greatly depend on the
evolution of Turkey-U.S. relations, which nowadays
are dominated by the quagmire that Iraq has become.
Should the Iraqi question as well as the PKK issue
start to shed their dominant influence on the bilateral
relationship, new areas of cooperation between the
United States and Turkey in the global and regional
security field can be explored with a renewed spirit
of cooperation. Turkish policy could then be more
attuned to the needs of the transatlantic community.
It should be recalled that whenever Turkish forces are
to be sent abroad to participate in a UN- or NATOled peacekeeping or peace enforcement mission, the
main criticism heard from the body politic is, How can
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Turkey spare these forces while it is waging a fight
against armed terrorists on its home turf? In that sense,
Turkey is indeed in a unique position among Alliance
members as a country faced with terrorism in the form
of guerrilla warfare. That is why Turkey’s military
contributions to recent peacekeeping operations have
not been commensurate with its actual capabilities.
Turkey’s contributions to peacekeeping and
peace enforcement operations, be they under the UN
or NATO umbrella or as part of a “coalition of the
willing,” will also be affected by the political climate
between Turkey and the United States. If that climate
is poor, we can expect Turkey to be less forthcoming
to the extent that these missions are led by the United
States or are identified as fulfilling a U.S. foreign policy
objective.
To conclude, what specific measures should be
taken to overcome the problems highlighted in this
analysis?
• The Cyprus issue must be addressed. The
negative impact of the ongoing dispute in Cyprus
cannot be overemphasized. Since Cyprus joined
the EU, the contagion potential of this regional
dispute in the political and security field has
been very clear. The NATO-EU relationship was
effectively hindered. More active involvement
of the United States will be critical in the search
for a lasting settlement. Indeed, with Cyprus
having gained EU membership, the United
States, as a non-EU member of the P-5 of the
UN Security Council, can be instrumental in
creating the proper incentives to budge the
Papadopoulos government. For what it is
worth, we should note that the new president
of Cyprus, Demetris Christofias, has issued
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a public pledge “to restart moribund talks to
reunify the island and [has] agreed to meet the
leader of the breakaway Turkish Cypriots.”1
• Turkey and the EU must engage in a program
of confidence building. The normalization
of the NATO-EU relationship will depend
to a great extent on the normalization of the
Turkey-EU relationship, which in turn depends
on two factors. The first one is Cyprus. As long
as the dispute remains unresolved, Turkey’s
EU aspirations will remain on hold. The
second factor is the EU’s approach to Turkey.
Notwithstanding the question of Cyprus, the EU
has been unable to send the right messages to its
putative future member and negotiating partner.
For instance, the “privileged partner” rhetoric
(i.e., in lieu of membership) refuses to abate.
The possibility of national referenda in some
member states on Turkish accession is a further
difficulty clouding the road to full membership.
Under these conditions, Turkish policymakers
and Turkish public opinion continue to nurture
doubts about the country’s ability ever to fulfill
the conditions for full membership. EU member
states must now simply allow Turkey to proceed
with the negotiations on the same basis as past
candidates. In addition, European institutions
as well as national governments should take
more responsibility in communicating with
their publics about enlargement, with a view to
building a more solid foundation for eventual
accession.
• Finally, even if the Cyprus obstacle is lifted,
the NATO-EU relationship may still stumble
as a result of the deep divisions regarding
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the future of NATO between the Atlanticist
members of the Alliance and the others.
Therefore, the rejuvenation of the transatlantic
dialogue, which seems to have started after the
French presidential elections, will hopefully
result in a more constructive debate about the
division of tasks between NATO and the EU.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8
1. “Cyprus Elects Communist President,” Washington Post,
February 25, 2008, p. A9.
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